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THE PRINCIPLES OF THE MORAL EMPIRE

BY

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PREFACE

WE have still too many gods and no God. Conscience and utility are two gods. So are the inner and the outer world, pride and love, individualism and collectivism.

To mention a few more, nations are gods, and classes are gods. It is natural for us to reduce all these dualistic and pluralistic gods to one God. This natural reduction, however, is only possible by means of synthetic creation. A new God fashioned from the substance of all existing gods is the thing which we now badly want. The sense of the dignity of one's own moral person is in need of being so heightened as to stand above all things else. No matter where the source of the world's light may be, so long as the light comes from without ourselves that source must be regarded as

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derivative, as only a reflection from some original source. The divine spark in the form of a metaphysical pride, which consists in a boundless self-respect and self-responsibility, as well as an infinite faith in our own power or creative possibility, is the light that illuminates the world. Organisation, on the one hand, and specialisation, on the other, must both be emphasised in view of the need of personal worth. Moral and theological reform, each of them pregnant with social reform, these are the things which this volume intends to convey.

I wish to express my indebtedness to Dr. W. Tudor Jones and Mr. J. T. Walley, M.A., for their kindness in reading the proofs.

K. SUGIMORI.

CLIFTON, BRISTOL,
October 1st, 1917.

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THE PRINCIPLES OF THE MORAL EMPIRE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

WE are now living in the most momentous time in comparison with which any age in history is simpler and smaller both in its magnitude and meaning. This war was bound to come, since, in the first place, it *has* come; and, in the second place, no progress has ever been made by our ancestors save at the cost of the heaviest sacrifice. And we who live now are not only the children who are born to reap the benefits sown by our forefathers, but are, at the same time, ourselves fathers responsible for the destinies of our children and posterity. We are, indeed, the only

fathers whose work is still as yet undetermined but remains to be determined by our own will. The circumstances into which our children will be born, and amidst which they will grow up, depend largely upon what we now will and do.

This war is, and has been, no doubt, lowering the level of culture, so far as superficial and temporary observations are alone taken into account. Everything which is not necessary for winning the war is altogether neglected. Art and Philosophy, for instance, are hardly worth twopence in the estimation of the public. Is the blame for this to be laid at the doors of the public and of mankind at large and not rather at the doors of contemporary artists and philosophers? The world does not exist for the sake of poets and thinkers. They alone are poets and thinkers who know how to inspire and enlighten the world which is real nowhere but where they live and can feel, think, and express themselves. I, as a self-convinced poet and thinker, am simply

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ashamed that I cannot by any deeds of mine pay the world all that I owe it, or, to speak more honestly, that I am a simple consumer of the world's "goods" and no producer of any of them. But this position is not one which I ought to be content with, as goes without saying. I should be no thinker or artist if I failed to be a thinker or an artist in relation to man and nature as they now exist. So long as I cannot give up my faith in the calling of poet or thinker, whether it be myself or anyone else, I must not for a moment excuse myself or anyone else who intends to be a poet or thinker, if we should let the world go by itself and without any help from the poet and thinker.

When I thought of the world at all I do not remember that I ever was confronted with more vital questions than the questions which I shall try to discuss in the following chapters. The relation between conscience and utility, as well as the nature and significance of each of them, has been for me a standing subject of investigation from my

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earliest days, both in theory and in practice. The three further questions, which will be the subjects of the rest of the volume, have alike been more or less permanent problems for me. The world is always full of problems. It would be ludicrous if one confined problems to some few as the most important problems. But no one will deny that there are problems in life and the world which are more central than others. The less peripheral a question is the more decisive influence it has upon other questions. Problems, no less than facts and values, are capable of being, and ought to be, reduced to an organised whole. Here precisely lies the part of a philosopher.

The oneness and correlation of conscience and utility, of the inner and the outer world, of pride and love, and of personal worth and social order, respectively as the two fundamental factors in our practical judgment, as the two representative dimensions of life, as the two most effective impulses in mortals, and as the part and the whole,

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almost absorb the principal issues appertaining to the ethical, or, in an intelligent meaning, religious interests of the time. Philosophers prior to Kant were guilty of dogmatism when they dealt with cosmological or ontological questions, without first examining the nature and significance of the human intellect which is the means by which we deal with those questions. Criticism or Methodology has thus come into existence and prominence. What I have dwelt on in this volume is something like a Theory of Knowledge, but which embraces the more practical, ethical or religious aspects of life and the world. We are now overwhelmed with pressing problems, social, moral, and theological. Political questions such as those regarding national and international issues, or economic questions such as the controversies in respect to wealth, labour, and classes, will hardly be solved unless moral and theological reforms have simultaneously been undertaken. On the other hand, however, we shall be unable not only to

solve, but even to discover, moral and theological questions as long as we are blind to the political, economic, and other practical aspects of life and society. Philosophers have been long enough dismissed from those spheres which constitute and determine more than half of human destiny and existence. The fault was altogether on the side of the philosophers, though they who were incapable of directing and influencing the world of affairs, even through the purest means of thought, were in truth no philosophers. We call those people philosophers who are lacking in business capacity, just as we call those people politicians who know nothing but how to exploit good and solid men and women for the mere sake of their own personal ambition under the disguise of public devotion. The victims are always the simple and good and industrious men and women. The salt of the earth is to be found amongst such as these. But, unfortunately, they are too often lacking in intelligence, and can scarcely be the light of the world. Both

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shepherds and their flocks, in intellectual as well as practical aspects, want now most badly a new supply of intelligence. Enthusiasm is no less important than intelligence for carrying out any reform or improvement in human circumstances and conditions. But intelligence must precede enthusiasm which, otherwise, will soon be defeated by natural forces with their inviolable laws, though these can be overcome and utilised by an intelligent will and enthusiasm.

People are always ready to be enkindled with some kind of enthusiasm or another, but seldom with intelligent enthusiasm. The most ordinary man or woman has, as a rule, no less amount of will-power, taken simply in a quantitative sense, than the most excellent man or woman. What distinguishes the one set of individuals from the other is not so much a mere will-power or enthusiasm as intelligence. Most individuals, now at the present moment and for some time past, are enthusiastic and exerting

their will-power to the utmost for nationalism and patriotism. The world has never before so exclusively in variety, and so extensively in compass, been determined in its mode of existence or in its movement. Nationalism and patriotism are now everything wherever we go. A brief review of history, political and cultural, since the time of the Ancient Greeks up to the present day, will tell us how capable people are of being inflamed with some passion or other, or how incapable they are of living without some enthusiasm or other. The essence of man as well as of the universe is something vital and impetuous. Creativeness is perhaps the happiest hit as the expression for it. That even the dullest individuals or ages cannot do well without some form or other of enthusiasm is quite in accordance with the nature of existence or of reality. What remains as the problem or task for us is, therefore, how to make the best use of this primary nature of man which might be termed the capacity for enthusiasm.

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Are we now, at the present moment, making the best use of our own nature in this connection ? Yes, in one sense, but No, in another. Yes, because we have not been taught a better outlook upon life, especially in respect to the social, moral, and theological sides of it, and so could not really have done anything better than we have done. But No, in another and more important sense, because we have not only *been* as we have, but have still to be as we *ought to be*.

As I have suggested elsewhere, war must be abolished not because it is war, but when it is the result of moral and intellectual weakness in the peoples responsible for it. When our moral and theological views, and, accordingly, sentiments, have been even so much enlightened and inspired as I personally am, though that is little enough in all conscience, I sincerely doubt whether a war such as the present one will still certainly be possible. I do not believe in the defeat of any particular nation for the mere

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reason that the nation is the enemy of some other nation or nations. An enemy, in order to be justifiable, must not be anything but the enemy of the moral cause in its ideal sense. It must be the enemy of God and of none or nothing else. But, are we, each one of the belligerents, sure that our own cause is the cause of God, or to put it in another way, of the best conscience of the world, when the matter has been thoroughly probed and sifted? The direct purpose of political conscience is to raise one's own country to a higher or to save it from a lower condition. But the more fundamental purpose which directs the immediate political conscience is not national but moral. Nationalism or patriotism is valuable because it is prompted by higher moral reasons and their necessity.

To be moral is, however, to be *personal*. The key to the entire entanglement is ultimately to be found where we find our own as well as our neighbours' personal worth. Nationalism no less than inter-

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nationalism is and ought to be more intelligently founded on the sole basis of personalism. *Know thyself* is once again what we have to realise.

But when social problems such as nationalism and internationalism, or aristocracy and democracy, have to be seriously dealt with, they are no longer merely social, but mainly moral problems. The moral problems, on the other hand, become the theological or metaphysical problems the moment their investigation and solution are undertaken by responsible hands. Those who find nothing real or of vital import in any sort of philosophical discussions are of no worth for the new politics which we are bound to create, just as those who feel like fish out of water when they face the visible and tangible world are of no use for the class of new Philosophy. We must so live as to be useful to our relatives, friends, and outsiders, so long as we can live at all. Thus it is high time for artists and thinkers to be born anew so that they may inspire the world a

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little more deeply and may illuminate it a little more brightly. Here also the personal resolve takes precedence of any other preparations and steps. We ourselves, meaning each and every one of contemporary mortals, must first of all be inspired and enlightened ere we are worthy or capable of the task of inspiring and enlightening others. I do not suggest that I myself am one of those who are most qualified in this line of activity. Indeed, what I shall say in the forthcoming pages will often be nothing but the confessions of my own inactive thoughts and feelings. But, of course, any man or woman, as well as myself, is more or less capable of thinking and feeling, and has some power of reforming the conditions of life whether they are merely transient or more enduring. Let us try, then, to do the best that we can.

CHAPTER II

THE TWO FACTORS IN PRACTICAL JUDGMENT : CONSCIENCE AND UTILITY

OF all the forms of ignorance from which we suffer the most portentous one is perhaps that connected with our practical judgment. Conscience, on the one hand, and utility, on the other, have been of old regarded as two self-subsistent or even contradictory principles. Have they ever really been such ? Never, so far as the conscience and the utility involved were the right ones. It is often futile for us to try to accomplish some honest improvement or reform on our human as well as social circumstances unless we know that unique and wonderful fact and truth, alongside of some sisterly ones referred to in our following chapters, which we may define

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as the oneness of conscience and utility, or, if you like, as the correlation of these two.

In the sphere of the Theory of Knowledge considerable progress has been made towards an empirical and biological interpretation of the so-called categories of cognition, whereas our moral theories and ideas are still very backward. Few, nowadays, will believe in the concept of causality, or of substance, as gifts inborn in our intellect, but as results won by, and grown from, the co-operative process of both experience and reason which make up an actual cognitive and intellectual activity. Reason alone can never be operative, and yet is nothing apart from being operative. Mere contact of one object with another, on the other hand, hardly makes possible an experience. The same holds true of the case of conscience and utility if we put conscience instead of reason, and utility instead of experience.

The fundamental categories in our intellectual activity, such as causality, substance, or time and space, have come into

being, partly because we have always been struggling for better arrangements of our more or less chaotic experiences in order that we might live as economically as possible, and partly, of course, because the world itself was of such a nature as to allow us to deal with it truthfully by means of those conceptions.

Conscience, when alone emphasised, would render existence for us impossible. For, conscience properly understood cannot but be the residue of calculation. How to exist better is all that calculation is interested in. If we take conscience to be something fundamentally different from, or even antagonistic to, utility or calculation, it is naturally impossible for us to live better than we do in the present moment, or even to live at all, provided that such a conscience is regarded as the all-powerful dictator for us individuals. The only alternatives for us will be, in that case, either to be faithful to our own conscience or not to exist. But, how can we realise any goodness or be good, or even

simply conceive of a goodness and badness at all if the problem how to exist is ignored? There is nothing to be called good or bad solely for itself. We have *something* which can be good or bad, and that *something* is always an existence. Good and bad are only adjectives presupposing something substantial. Good as well as bad can be our concerns so long as we exist, or so long as how to exist interests us. Our moral discussions start with an existence. Besides, it is clear that we cannot think seriously of non-existence when we remember that an existence can never be turned into non-existence but only into another form of existence. We can remove an existence from the present to the future, or hither and thither, but this does not mean that we can annihilate it altogether. Any possible change, natural as well as artificial, whether in quantity or in quality, is a change within the realm of existence. If we have an insight into the *meaning* of a change, whatever exists never perishes but continues to

exist under the conditions of growth and evolution of the world as a whole. Conscience is the immediate voice of the whole self dictating our actions. What else can it be but the reflection of a calculation together with the whole bias of the self as well as its widest possible circumstances? What our calculation tells us is clear and definite. It is capable of being explained. There is in it a fulness of positivistic Logic. But that is all; there is, that is to say, no divine Logic in it. We, however, even as individuals, are not merely finite beings, but most obviously infinite beings. The universe, with both its spiritual and material sides, concentrates here and there. Each of us is where it concentrates, is what this concentration consists of as well as makes up. Within the endless whole, which is represented at the most intensive and exclusive point as self-consciousness, we are finite in proportion to the range and limit which we can more or less artificially define there. The narrower, shorter, and shallower we

define that range the smaller self or individuality we get. Calculation in its zeal for certitude and accountability tends to contract the sphere of interests relevant to the self. If we rely on calculation alone it is only too likely that we shall realise a small self. Calculation is mainly the work of our intellect. Intellect loves definiteness, and is capable only of apprehending the *relations* of things but not the things themselves. Calculation, therefore, knows only *how* things should be or could be, and thus presupposes something more primary and essential, namely, what they are. It gives us the *How* but not the *What*. Now *How* is merely an abstract quality; while *What* is a reality possessed of that quality. If we rely on calculation alone, we shall never attain to the absolute and the reality. The very depth and essence of our own life as well as of the world will be a sealed book to us. Shallow intellectualism or positivism illustrates this. On the other hand, however, if we rely on conscience without calculation,

we shall come short both of wisdom, intelligence, and of works. But these it is that carry us through in our life-struggle. False mysticism illustrates this.

Calculation when properly understood is the way in which we do justice to our capability of intellect. Conscience, when properly recognised, is the recognition of our very own essence of existence for the sake of which we live and calculate. So long as intuition is an actual endowment of ours, conscience has its own inviolable and also by no means interchangeable part and function, the most important function of all functions. Mysticism, if it is anywhere to be found at all, must be sought for in the domain of conscience and intuition.

We feel what we *are*. We are conscious that we exist. The simplest kind of self-consciousness bears the seed of conscience. Self-consciousness is the starting-point of conscience. But, as life grows on, we cease merely to feel, but begin to feel more or less on reasoned ground. The development of

intellectual elements as an accompaniment of feeling constitutes what we call calculation, which is the foremost characteristic of utility. The history of Utilitarianism or of its latest offspring Pragmatism can be traced as far back as human and biological history itself. The simplest animal forms, such as Monera or Protozoa, have the sense of direction. They move towards their food and turn away from poisonous objects. They love their own existence and know how to protect and promote it. The instinct of self-preservation is clearly seen in what they do. When they discriminate between a food and a poison even at a distance there is Pragmatism, rudimentary though it is, based on calculation of utility or of consequence. There is, however, conscience or intuition in them as evident as their own existence. What indeed can their whole existence as a vital impulse be but conscience or organised intuition? Conscience is nothing but an organised intuition. We may speak of an intuitive judgment in respect to the playing

of a piano, or in regard to a picture, or any particular business, thing, or person. It does not mean, however, that we are speaking of conscience. All our judgments, whether æsthetic, or logical, or practical, in their immediate process consist of nothing but intuition and instinct. The most elaborate intellectual activity is in its momentary aspect an intuition. We plan out long schemes covering the coming ten years or ten generations or even ten centuries. Our objective may be placed so far off as to belong to eternity. But, who then are they that work in advance for those future millions and milliards of moments as though these were a single span of time? They are no other than we who live now and can think momentarily though successively. As we exist in the present moment alone we can never think but in the present moment. We can live and think and calculate only in this and the next and the still further next moment, actually, therefore, in this moment solely, where alone our existence is real.

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We can never transcend the present moment either in action or in thought but yet can make things beyond the present moment the most actual concerns for our momentary thought or action. The meaning of our present thought and action can lie as far beyond the present moment as we like. But our activity, whether mental or physical, is possible neither in a past moment nor in a future moment, but in the present. We live each moment a partial life in some way or other, and have this moment to eat, the next to talk, and the third to walk, leaving always a vast portion of our capabilities and interests not actually operative. Self as empirical is definitely limited by some particular engagements and occupations mental as well as physical. We exist, however, not merely as an empirical self, but as a more comprehensive, wider whole. It is necessary for us to be able to grasp clearly and firmly the whole self at the same time as we realise our empirical self. Conscience has come into existence and has grown under no other

necessity than this very one of self-preservation and realisation. An action or a thought which has bearing upon interests beyond the moment has still at every moment to decide between a Yea and a Nay. How could we be sure of this supremely important part of the art of living had it not been for conscience? For, as we have said before, conscience is an organised intuition, suggestive of the whole content of our own ideal self, both in and beyond the present moment. We are essentially and originally intuitive agents. Out of the primitive stage of development as merely momentarily intuitive beings we have gradually grown into more and more serial and systematic intuitiveness. The whole history of intellect, starting from simple sensations through perceptions and ideas up to the most complex and comprehensive conceptions, shows this process of intuitive or intellectual growth. Calculation itself is in its substance intuition. But in calculation more than momentary interests of the self are taken in, and thus calculation

is expressive of a larger self than the self implied in merely momentary and, therefore, unorganised intuition. On the other hand, however, even the best calculation can hardly stand on the highest level that we can attain in our search for a possible organisation of intuitions or organised intuition. Conscience crowns the best calculation. Calculation proceeds from a more primitive sort of conscience; it is, throughout its own process, directed by the existing conscience, and results in a more developed sort of conscience. Semi-organised intuition must be reached before we get the whole organised intuition. Few will be doubtful as to the possibility and need of educating our power of calculation. But few will be ready to admit the possibility and need of further educating our conscience. If we are capable of, and in need of, making constant progress and improvement anywhere at all, it must be in our own conscience rather than elsewhere. We often calculate in accordance with modern and most efficient

devices, whilst holding fast by an antique and obsolete conscience. Seldom are we consistent in what we do and in what we are. We use tools and yet we believe in the old theology of the Creator beyond and above us. We must educate our conscience first and foremost. The principal way, however, for us to educate conscience is to make the most of our empirical capabilities and acquirements. Calculation is the supreme education for conscience.

Conscience needs to be intelligent. Ignorance is the enemy of conscience. Those who take for a conscience something altogether alien or hostile to utility have no idea of what conscience really is. They forget the proper place of mysticism by forgetting the proper place of intellectualism. The world can be disentangled and systematised by means of intellect, but will be left, after all the intellectual effort done, somehow still unexplained. The *thing in itself* is the permanent home of mysticism where calculation goes out and returns but never becomes

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the master of the home. Kant was, as elsewhere, suggestive in this aspect of his observations, though he made both the world of relations and the world of *things in themselves* shadowy and hardly real, a result due to the fact that his ability for classification was not sufficiently leavened with the more fundamental ability for unity. Similarly, he was wrong when he asserted that we must be observant of moral laws and precepts whatever the consequence might be. There is no single rule or principle which we are bound to observe save the rule and principle that our actions should be followed by the best possible consequences. The Categorical Imperative comes not merely from the side of the momentary intuition, but it must be the very voice of the highest attainable organised intuition. The best consequence awaiting us throws its reflection upon the momentary intuitiveness. This is where conscience psychologically or actually originates. Such reflection, however, does not come in any mysterious way. Calculation,

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whose method is always centrifugal, but whose spirit is constantly centripetal, must precede. Calculation, when earnestly carried out, will force the whole tendency of the self over the threshold of attention and thus make of it what we might call an apperception. The self apperceived makes the walls as well as the indwelling seat of an actual conscience. It is only natural for such a self to become a definite resolve followed by action. Knowledge, will, and action, alongside of the world which circumscribes them, are what a conscience is most intimately bound up with. In order to be moral we must apperceive our own actual self, which is absolutely impossible if we neglect all calculation of consequence and utility. To live an ideal moral life is no less a practical business than to drive a motor-car through the traffic of London. Both require alertness, skill, and constant calculation.

It is time for us to blow away all the fogs hanging over and around the traditional ideas of conscience. The voice of

conscience is absolute, not because it is the voice of conscience, but because it is the final crystallisation of all calculations, actual as well as *potential*, touching the consequences or utility of a person's actions. We have, during our biological and historical evolution, learned that fragmentary intuitions alone do not suffice for us in order to live and live well. We have grown so as to be capable of calculation. We have, however, been badly in need of something more comprehensive than calculation in directing our own destiny. Conscience has thus come into prominence. We have forgotten, by our natural inclination to idleness, the original meaning of conscience as something more than calculation, and slipped into the deceitful concept of conscience as that which spares us the toil of knowing, working, and, above all things, experimenting. Conscience must be once again brought into the daylight of the busiest street of the most practical town; it must be rescued from the obscure shrine to which as to some Delphi it has been

banished by Kantians and other similar minds. But, on the other hand, it would be fatal for us if we burnt down the shrine altogether and started to erect there business premises or factories or government offices. For, as Socrates inarticulately expressed it, calculation alone often fails us in making a decision, and its place must then be taken by that inner daimonic voice which, if it means anything, can only mean conscience. The voice of his daimon was for Socrates the sign pointing in the direction where the most fortunate issue lay. It was in essence, or in principle, or again in meaning, not different from or against calculation of utility. It was the organised intuition which was something more than calculation—the apperception of the actual as well as the potential tendency of the self and of its relevant world. Calculation is hardly worth our while if it is not for the sake of something more immediately personal. If we destroy Delphi altogether we shall find that the very life and soul has gone out of business and

politics and indeed of all our mundane pursuits. Communication between the divine and the human, if you like such terminology, is only possible and valuable when it stands for communication between the right conscience and the right utility. Conscience and utility are the predestined partners in one and the same work, namely, personal self-preservation and self-assertion. Sometimes it is the case that where calculation ends conscience begins. In such a case we shall have to face a death-struggle between a definite but limited calculation on the one hand, and an intense but vague conscience on the other. But he who, after the struggle, decides in favour of conscience will win the highest victory. If we could calculate all the possible circumstances relevant to success or failure, it would be for our benefit to do so. But such possibilities are rare, as the anti-Utilitarian thinkers have often argued. The late Professor of Philosophy at Munich, Theodor Lipps, tried his utmost to defend the standpoint Kant took up in regard to

conscience by designating the feeling of the value of personality. He speaks of utility, whether individual or collective, as something unworthy of moral consideration, and looks upon the experience of personal value as the precious essence of morality. He was right when he emphasised the importance of the inner evidence which remains absolutely subjective. He was, however, altogether wrong when he laughed at utility or calculation. He was laughing at his own ideal worth when he thought he was laughing at his enemy's. Besides, to speak slightly of utility or calculation shows too clearly the lack of honest reflection in those teachers themselves. No one in fact has ever lived as a mere talker but as a doer who is necessarily a Utilitarian or a Pragmatist, especially when he is morally worthy.

A Utilitarian or a Pragmatist, however, is the most unfortunate person in the world if his Utilitarianism or Pragmatism is of such a nature as to exist against or in spite of conscience. When do we calculate? Now

at the present moment. Why do we calculate? For the sake of the present as well as the future, both actual and potential self. How do we calculate? By means of the intuitive though serial activity of our intellect. If we are simply centrifugal as calculation tends to make us, the result will be the loss of self. What good is there if we gain the whole world, but at the same time lose our own self, soul, and life? Calculation itself is divine if we read rightly the meaning and tendency of it. A divine principle is most manifestly working in calculation if we are ready to recognise that to be divine is to be somehow real and, indeed, most real. Conscience which drives us to non-existence is the nearest kin to calculation or utility which deprives us of soul and of the infinite potentiality which directs our finite actual self and its destiny. A true Delphi ought never to be out of but right in the midst of shops and shopmen, of mechanics and politicians. One who is the most fortunate before the altar as well as in the counting

house, whether as a nation or as an individual, will be he or she who commands the two guiding principles of our practical judgment not one at the expense of the other but one as the corrector and assistant of the other.

When in pursuit of certain ends we follow a course in conformity with calculation, but at variance with our deepest though undefinable inclination or disinclination, we sooner or later discover that we have been guilty of miscalculation. It was a calculation right and genuine, so far as the advantages and disadvantages taken in the calculation are alone concerned. But there were some other advantages and disadvantages which were even more vital to the fortunes of the same self than those clearly defined ones. As the calculation of the self and not of a portion of the self it was, therefore, a miscalculation. When we act, however, in conformity with our deepest though undefinable inclination and disinclination but at variance with the results of the momentary calculation, we shall sooner or later find that

we have acted upon a larger basis of calculation than that which we were actually capable of. It is necessary for us to watch with a careful and circumspect eye how the calculative judgment of utility on the one hand, and an inarticulate, more or less daimonic voice of conscience on the other, work out our fortunes with two different methods but on one and the same principle. Calculation tends to make us localise our sphere of activity, whereas conscience tends to make us universalise it. Calculation loves definiteness even at the expense of wholeness, whereas conscience loves wholeness even at the expense of definiteness. Either of the two, taken by itself, is irresponsible and unreliable. The man who knows the art of living is the man who has full control of these two factors. But conscience, when taken in its complete sense, is the power which enables us to have that control. Faith and works, God and the world, how to be in the present and what to become in the future—all these questions

alike solve themselves when we get to the secret of calculation and conscience with all their inner and outer relations. Often we calculate in order to lose ourselves. And often we are conscientious in order to lose the world. But as the world and the self are intimately connected with each other and are at bottom one, both agents as conscience and utility, though in our empirical psychology they may appear ill-connected and ill-united, must be realised in their ultimate meaning as nothing but the best friends who promote the constructive life of the super-functional being as a moral person.

But, as a matter of fact, no one has ever neglected a calculation when he knew the utility of the calculation. Believers in most of the mystic principles are believers in some Utilitarian meaning which is the secret of those principles. Faith from the time of the primitive Christians up to the time of Mrs. Eddy and her followers is nothing but Pragmatism fitted to the believer's own intelligence. The expectation of the millennium or

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of curing by no other means than intense desire is purely pragmatic. Indeed, such faith is too purely pragmatic to be effective. Believers in it saw where they were, and knew what they would like to become, but they had not the faintest idea of *how* to achieve their desire. Modern Pragmatism pays due attention to the *How*, the process of idealisation of nature and all actual forces and circumstances. Intelligence is what we as proper Pragmatists thirst for. The genuineness or falseness of a Pragmatism we distinguish by testing its intellectual quality and quantity.

Cardinal virtues such as wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice, or faith, hope, and charity, are all pragmatic in their origin as well as growth, that is, in their nature as well as significance. Their history is similar to that of logical concepts, as we mentioned above when referring to causality, substance, etc. None of those moral concepts, no more than the logical ones, is categorical. They are not categorical because they are not *a priori* but empirico-teleological. Their func-

tion is to serve the purpose of an actual improvement in us and in the world. They are categorical where and so long as the real improvement is made the best possible by their help. Because they are as a rule most useful instruments for our moral work, which is nothing but preservation and promotion of life, they are practically taken to be the end itself. Notwithstanding their nearness to the kernel of worth they are still very partial and material in comparison with their master-reality, which is absolutely whole and spiritual, and for which conscience stands.

Our final emphasis must naturally be placed upon conscience and not upon utility because theoretically conscience can even include utility, and because in practice most of us have too great a faith in utility and too small a faith in conscience. We suffer from our ignorance as to what true utility is and can be, but we suffer more from our ignorance as to what true conscience is and can be. Most individual as well as social vices and

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blunders come from our too feeble confidence in our conscience. We yield too soon to the temptations or threats of calculation and give up too peacefully the stronghold of conscience. Thus we miss the only opportunity for us to discover another and more constructive calculation, which grows only from another and more intense conscience. This latter conscience, which is the right one, we can never obtain unless we wage a most hazardous and obstinate war against every momentary temptation and threat of calculation. This is the way in which we can develop our character. Nothing can be more effectively pragmatic for us than to gain a greater character. This accounts for the worldly success of a fine moral character, and the worldly failure of a basely utilitarian character, to speak nothing of the seemingly successful and unsuccessful careers of the worldly and the morally lofty characters. An arrow will only fly as the bow is bent. Every stress and strain which we give to our conscience by fighting against momentary

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calculation will intensify that conscience, and soon prove to be a larger and more proper calculation. Even before such objective evidence, these stresses and strains were still not altogether solitary and single-handed because the tendency of reality at its bottom was ever more and more in their favour. This is precisely the psychology of most, or really all, eminently great characters, whether men or women, now as of old, when they willingly sacrificed their own petty interests for the sake of some enduring and fruitful interest. Small characters cannot see what great characters take for advantages and disadvantages, or for gain and loss. Where small characters find the most attractive consequences, great characters often find the most unbearable self-sacrifice. A deeper conscience commands a wider view of destiny. There was never a great personality who really sacrificed himself. What seems their self-sacrifice was for them, with a greater than mathematical certainty, a self-gain. One who is pragmatic against

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the organised intuition which has undefinable fringes, indicative of the cosmic-personal being, is he who is most reckless and unfortunate in this world and in any other world possible for him to live in.

What is true of an individual is equally true of a nation or of any kind of human association, the moral responsibility of which falls after all nowhere but upon its individual persons. The rise and fall of a nation was never so fundamentally due to any other causes, whether natural or human, than to its own conscience. In order to be a great nation what is first needed for us is to have a great conscience. Honest travellers often tell us that people of a great country or of a rising country have, allowing, of course, for many individual exceptions, a higher standard of moral ideals and practice than the people of a small country or a declining country. There is something worth noticing about this story. As a nation, no less than as an individual, we must be able, so able indeed as to excel any other nation or indi-

vidual. This is good for the development of human ability itself. By developing our own abilities we naturally provoke the development of the abilities of our neighbours, even under the sheer necessity of competition or of adaptation for the sake of pride and of existence. Modern Germany as a nation has no doubt been an example in this respect. Perhaps William II can be taken as an illustration of the individual case. But abilities alone do not suffice either for a nation or for an individual in creating its own best fortunes. We must have character, as high a moral character as can be the inspiring source of the conscience in any other individual or nation. The combination of the finest soul and of the ablest hands and brain is the nation or the individual that is the fittest and will survive. Where is such a nation or an individual? Nowhere as yet. A full possibility and opportunity are altogether open to any individual or nation to be itself the fittest to survive and succeed. One who

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undertakes this most ambitious and at the same time most sacred task now at once will be the most fortunate nation and individual. But to be able, as able as any worldly hero might be, and concomitantly to be good, as good as any philanthropic saint might be, is hardly possible for us unless we know the correlation and oneness of conscience and utility, both in practice as well as in theory. Removal of individual evils must be done here as elsewhere before any successful removal of social, inclusive of national and international, evils can be expected.

CHAPTER III

THE TWO DIMENSIONS OF LIFE : THE INNER AND THE OUTER WORLD

THE scientific and technical development of modern times has taught us that life does not consist of mere internal reality, but owes its existence and growth in a very large measure to the influence of external reality. If we consider primitive Christianity or even Jesus himself, though these are instances not so patent as Buddhism and its founder, it is difficult to believe that they were as clearly and intensely aware of the external side of life as they were of the inner. When "I have overcome the world" was uttered by Jesus, this utterance had no adequate justification in the presence of a corresponding reality. It had in itself no equiva-

lent amount of reality. No great man whom we have ever had, not to speak of other men, has ever yet overcome the world, as is plainly proved by the history both of mankind and the universe. The world has never been such a semblance that it could be brought into existence or resolved into non-existence by any mere subjective force or attitude. Hence it is that we can hardly lay too much weight upon the *Pragmatic* point of view. We must always be fully conscious of the hardness of reality on whichever side we turn. Let us never imagine that it is possible for us to be good men without doing good things amidst all the complexities of reality. A man is good when he creates a good thing in the *system* of the real world, which good thing replaces some lower state of existence. A mere motive or sentiment does not suffice at all. Even an evil or a bad thing, in so far as it exists, has so much good as belongs to the fact of its existence though no more. A great man is not great merely because he has been

crucified. Jesus was great because, in spite of his partial defeat at one moment of his life, he still had an extraordinary power of doing things which were of benefit to the world beyond that moment. The Crucifixion, taken by itself, was only a shame. To be good means to exist, and vice versa. Why certain conduct is not good depends solely upon its not being the best possible means of achieving the best for one's own existence. And why dishonourableness and unkindness are amongst the worst evils depends also solely upon their not being the best but the worst possible ways of determining oneself in connection with existence. A thing which is good but not existent, or tends towards non-existence, is a phantom or a self-contradictory conception. So, on the other hand, we are not at all justified in condemning a thing as an evil unless we do so by condemning its existence. To condemn an action or thing must be in effect the condemning of its existence. To condemn an existence is only possible by means of a

superior existence. To say that one thing is, in a moral sense, better than another cannot but mean that the former has, or is bound to have, a greater existence than the latter. Conflicts between the good and the evil, or the right and the wrong, are always conflicts between two attitudes, one of which is towards more existence whilst the other is towards less existence. To be brought into real existence is the final goal of every good motive and intention, otherwise these are nothing. If we are led to think that we are good, without bringing forth something better than that which already exists, simply because we are good in our motive and intense in our inner appreciation of good things, no error could be grosser. Suppose that I was entrusted with a girl by her parents to look after her through her journey along a dark and deserted way and happened to meet an evil person who was about to do her injury, could I still be a good man if I then failed to protect her on account of my physical inability, in spite of my being

very intense in moral indignation and anxiety? At least, could I still be the perfectly good man whom you would require on such an occasion? My answer is absolutely in the negative. I should be almost as bad as the ruffian himself.

Let us not be too modest in our setting up of moral ideals. Let us be altogether, and not merely to some extent, good men. Let us be absolutely good men before whom no evil forces can stand at all. Let us be, again and finally, perfectly powerful in the execution of those moral values of ours which are both good and right.

The conception of Freedom—I could hardly ever be convinced otherwise—has been misfashioned by mankind for so long a time, and in no less shocking a way than the conception of a “good man.” How could it be said that I am free before I have possessed an existence which extends over all the domains of reality? Freedom can never be present for a man unless he has grown up to the very extent to which reality exists.

To think of oneself or of any other as being free in spite of his being as yet only a part of reality, and not quite the reality itself, is a total and most harmful misconception. I am afraid that Buddhism and Indian thought in general have simply assumed that we could become free by means of inner readjustment or modification. What one can reach by such means will at most be a certain degree of paralysis of one's own nature—paralysis of the natural desire for Freedom. Freedom, true Freedom, can only be attained by an attitude for which there are no two lives or realities such as the inner and the outer, but one life and one reality which is in itself all in all.

There is for us but one reality or life. Any kind of effort on our part is of significance only when it is by and for that one reality. To think of oneself or of any other as free merely by virtue of a state of inner attitude alone is not only an illusion, but also a kind of dishonourable deception. Let us not imagine any being, be it ourselves

or any great man, or if you like, any super-human being, to be great enough unless that being has obtained its greatness not only in its *inner* world but in its *entire* existence which strides over the two worlds and holds them as one. In the same way let it be remembered that we should not think ourselves or any other free so long as our being is as yet actually limited, on whatever side of existence that may be. The existence of every individual being signifies nothing less than that that being is one of the pivots of the entire world. Nothing could be more illusory, and no illusion could be more destructive for us, than to think of ourselves as confronting the world and not representing it. To treat the world as if it were an alien and often, besides, an antagonistic existence only indicates how blind we are to ourselves and to the breadth and depth of our own existence. We are in need of getting ourselves out of the long deception of treating our own territories as if they were someone else's territories, of treating our own qualities

and quantities as if they were someone else's qualities and quantities, and thus of treating ourselves like others.

Instead of making out of the things of the world, which are opposed or indifferent to us, alien or hostile images we should be awakened to the plain fact that we have realised ourselves as yet only imperfectly. It is here that our sense of responsibility has to play its proper rôle. What could any one of our experiences which is not quite agreeable to us, be, whatever sort of things or matters it concerns, if it is not an indication of some fault or, if you like, sin of ours, for which we are and ought to make ourselves responsible to the very extent to which that experience is traceable at all? If we are not responsible or are not willing to make ourselves responsible for any unpleasant or disagreeable things and experiences we meet with—that is, if we are not quite ready to feel them as our own faults and willing to make them good entirely on our own responsibility—we are not at all

justified in our feeling and thinking of them as unpleasant or disagreeable. We are right in evaluating a thing bad only when we are aware of our responsibility for making it good. Criticism has no right to be present at all amongst us if it is not for the necessary first step of a growing responsibility, and if that first step is not to be followed by the necessary second and final step of the same responsibility in the form of a real creation or re-establishment.

We are all evaluating beings just because we are conative, and, in turn, we are all conative beings just because we are essentially creative. The mere fact that we are by nature conative or creative beings suffices to prove that there is no inner life attainable to us except that which is from top to bottom perfectly interconnected with, and correlated to, external life and reality. There is no thing or state which could be called inner independency unless this appellation be a convenient label marking a state which is independent on both sides of one's exist-

ence, not only on the side of subjective mood, but also on the side of the real and tangible complexities of the world. A mere inner independency is not an imaginable existence save for a kind of paralytic consciousness or a mind capable of deceit, both of which are simply harmful and shameful. There is nothing wonderful in the fact that Buddhism and other modes of Indian thought in general should fail to promote the movement of humanity towards its proper goal. They do at most only cultivate the shadowy side of life and reality, which side, of course, is also of some value. To study death and its concerns is itself no wrong thing at all, provided that it does not become the main business and is not pursued instead of the study of life and its concerns. For Buddhists themselves, what they have done, and been interested in, might be claimed as done for the sake of life, but such a claim could not be accepted by us who are taught and are convinced by our inner as well as outer experiences that life means creativeness.

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Buddhists were creative, as there could be no life apart from its being creative to some degree or other. That degree, however, in which they were creative fell hopelessly far short of sufficing for humanity at large and especially for humanity in its evolution. Mankind needs a greater degree of creativeness than that found in Buddhism and its adherents; and this is quite in accord with the nature of mankind. Man is too intelligent a being to be beguiled for any great length of time into the attempt to control life by means of mere subjective readjustment. To get rid of all evil passions and dwell in a state of entire apathy, of what value could this be even supposing it were possible and brought into being and effect? The heavens will remain just as they were, and the earth and all the things and events will remain and operate just as they had done before—as if nothing *new* had happened in the system of their own elements. Reality will be least affected by that event which took place in the midst of its evolving com-

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plexities, but which was so scantily related to external things as to produce no positive influence on them and, therefore, could not be anything more than a mere subjective readjustment.

Stoicism and its enthusiasts laid stress upon *will*, but the will which they took hold of was hardly worthy of the name, for it had only to do with the realities of the subjective life and not with creative activity. To control the reality of the inner life is significant only when it is understood that it is the preliminary stage of controlling external realities, which are bound up in the most intimate manner with the inner realities.

One's mode of existence should be such as to allow us to conceive that it originates in one's inner and inmost centre of life, and extends by degrees over all the realm of existence. Perhaps we are right when we think that what made Stoicism or Buddhism fail to take hold of existence in its entirety, and caused both to cling solely to the inner

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side of life, was not so much the result of intellectual inability as insufficient vigour. We might almost say that mankind obtained its first insight into the nature of life as it is and as it ought to be when it stepped into the spirit and meaning of the modern age. And this has been accomplished in a great measure owing to its increasing vitality and strength of will. We have begun to realise that life itself is so "given" as to be something which is to become more and more intensive in order that it may become more and more extensive in the realm of external existence. That life is, according to its nature, intensive and ought to be ever more so, is suggested to us, first of all, by some flashes coming from the artistic, literary, and philosophical aspirations of modern souls. On the other hand, we are confronted with the plain fact and truth that no life could be preserved both in its value and reality unless it was constantly brought into a fuller existence, whose mode and nature are not merely for such a life itself, but, in an

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undeniable way, are also for other lives and existences. We are led thus, in the main, by our own enthusiasm and deeds (which are the expression of our creative activities) characteristic of modern civilisation, a civilisation technical and industrial amongst other things. And to this we have not as yet been quite conscientiously alive. We have not been quite conscientiously alive to our own abounding activities and our own eager enthusiasm precisely because of our inability to get rid of traditional ideals which have really been outgrown by our life-contents and conscience. Conscience is always at hand if only we are well awake to those activities and interests which make us what we are and apart from which we are nothing. A living conscience is the only conscience which is genuine, and no living conscience will be found in us if we act in one way and think in another. We are absorbed by an almost fanatic zeal for promoting our material welfare. But we may be devoting ourselves to this without realising whether

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or not we are justified in so doing. We are in practice keenly anxious for the betterment of the material conditions of our existence, whilst we are woefully weak in our moral convictions touching such desires and actions. There is amongst us scarcely a single individual who could conscientiously ignore his own main interests for the sake of a moral or religious "cause" however much he might himself imagine that he was making some sacrifice of these interests of his. No true moral or religious "cause" would ever come to such a pass as to require us to act at the expense of our own interests or against these interests, because such a "cause" draws all its impetus solely from the vital and real interests of living individuals. In the same manner it must be recognised as a matter of course that we should not think a true moral or religious life possible on the mere foundation of inner freedom or inner good, because these latter virtues are themselves really absolute unrealities save for ignorant or dishonourable minds. Hence

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it is that we should develop ever farther all the aspects of outward civilisation, technical, industrial, and so forth, for the very purpose of realising freedom just as we should develop ever farther all the aspects of inward culture—art, religion, and so forth. When we fail to appreciate properly either one or the other of these two large dimensions of life we do so with no other result than the failure to appreciate both. Our intensification of life, be it by means of literature, or art, or religion, will always be found to involve externalising life in order that it may be upheld in the best way. To uphold life in the best way is possible only by paying due heed to its every dimension, one of which is represented by art, literature, philosophy, and religion, and the other by technics, economics, and politics. This relation between intensification of life and its externalisation will become clearer if we reflect upon some of our own personal experiences which would show us in a simpler form what our intensifying effort

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at any time in our past, or in any of its forms, may have meant—that is, what issued out of it for ourselves as its transformed continuity. We shall find that there was no intensifying effort which had not the effect of raising ourselves to a state of a wider existence towards external reality. Thus it was that a critical moment in one's own inner life became the forerunner of a period of intense external activity; or that conversion, pushing its roots deep into the inner and inmost soil of one's own existence, came unmistakably later on to put forth its blossoms and bear its fruits in the light of day. Thus it was again that the intense feeling and thinking of some genius, which took place in his own secret chamber, had necessarily some day to catch the people in the market-place so that they perhaps awkwardly but still willingly made themselves his mouthpieces and instruments.

We are beings so made that each as an individual, and likewise all as a corporate body of some size or other—the largest one

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being that of Humanity in general—find ourselves continually engaged in solving the problem how to obtain freedom and still more freedom. Life being from the beginning two-sided, we ought to have realised the need of setting a true value upon the external side of it earlier than we did, and ought to have attempted to establish freedom not on the mere basis of inner independency (a thing really impossible), but on the complete foundation of an independency which asserts itself towards both sides at once. Let us always have before ourselves a mighty and deep-rooted vision in which we see our ideal life melted into one whole and asserting itself as an ever-creating unity in and for which there are no two such things as “appearance” and “reality,” or matter and spirit, but absolutely one life and reality which is itself in its entirety always creative. One of the results of realising this must necessarily be that we should become so changed as to participate in the promotion of the material sides of life so that we should

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enjoy an entire consciousness that we do so under the prompting of our inner and inmost self which makes itself felt as a direct and imperative need of our religious faith or moral conviction. The feeling that we are busy with a merely external, and not with the very central, matter of life, which easily comes to us when we are busy with a matter which is in appearance material or worldly, will altogether disappear. Our technical, industrial, and political, in short, all our secular activities, will become no other than our very moral or religious activities themselves. And, on the other hand, we shall never forget that our religious or moral self can never be conserved and furthered unless it *works*.

Material interests or activities are one thing, and the religious or moral self is another thing. How could it be possible for us, so long as we are in such a traditional misconception as that, to realise, on the one hand, the true significance of material interests or activities, and, on the other,

the real meaning of the religious or moral self, and, consequently, to realise what life is as well as what it ought to be? We must always work in a religious spirit, for by so doing alone can we do the best work. And we must always believe in a *working* consciousness, as we can by so doing *believe* best.

How many good deeds must have been left undone in the history of humanity just because good men lacked a proper idea of what a good man means, and because they stinted their power in realising good things in the real and actual world which, instead, has too unsparingly been subjected to the wickedness of shallow but still, in a way, able men. Wickedness comes to exist where one is to some degree able but shallow. It was a pity not only for the people suffering through them but also for themselves and their very purposes of striving that so many of the heroic figures in the world's history did not realise the value of getting rid of their shallowness and of utilising their abilities in the best way. The French philosopher

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and sociologist, Tarde, in referring to his national hero, Napoleon, said: "But if he, with a trifle less strength of will, lively imagination, and enterprise, had combined a little more of that despised thing called heart and sense of duty, should we not now be chief among the nations of the earth?" Would it not have paid him and his purpose of life if that great man of ability had fulfilled the ideal requirement of his critic?—although I myself should suggest that there was really no need of advising Napoleon to have a trifle less strength of will, lively imagination, and so forth, but only and most reasonably of making him fully alive to himself and his ambition so that he might from an inner necessity come to take another attitude which was deeper and which would have enabled him to satisfy his wishes in a more far-reaching manner than the attitude he took. Could he have only realised a trifle more strength of will, lively imagination, and enterprise, he would have made out of his own self a

different hero, who would have been mighty and glorious not only for small Napoleons, but also for, so to speak, small Jesuses who were as well always to be found in individuals and in mankind. He could dare to despise heart and sense of duty just because he fell short of a trifle more strength of will, lively imagination, and enterprise, for we see that all the strength of his will was somehow measurable, and was great mainly in the direction of peripheral and temporal matters of life. A really strong will would hardly allow itself to be content with conquering external reality alone, leaving the internal indifferent or antagonistic to itself, which should some day come out of its obscurity to the surface and put an end to such a will whose entire course is solely traceable along some shallow layers of life which have little to do with, and share little of, the deeper and most intimate pleasures and pains of life. Who could convince us that a man who did help one of his weak and best friends at the expense of getting

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sway over a world in its enormous extensiveness was not always greater than another man who did just the reverse? The honour of strong will might well be attained by the former. Let us have a strong will, which is strong not only in relation to external and temporal realities, but also, and rather, in relation to internal and eternal realities whose natural surface-phenomena the first-said realities ought to be. One's will could be strong to some considerable extent, and with the secondary important matters of life and the world, without drawing its strength right from the deeper and inmost emotional life of one's own where alone one's very central interest of life could be found, and from where alone the most graceful way of self-expression, either in deeds or in mental communications, as one's natural and necessary self-preservation could arise and grow. To have the strongest possible will within one's own reach, which would enable one to work at one's best, must be to realise the significance of an intense

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life with all its relations to one's outward existence.

The point is that one must rather be determined to become God than to be determined to become any other thing, because the latter is always smaller than the former. If it were more attractive for Napoleon to become an unheard-of conqueror and emperor rather than to become God, it must be in this point that his limitation was most glaring. The ideal height and strength of one's own will ought never to fall short of the will, so to speak, to become God. As our most idealistic way is always to be found, in a sense, in our most naturalistic way, so also here one is truest to one's own nature when one is determined to become God rather than to become anything else. By working for, and acting on, the will to become God one can realise one's own whole nature best. Any attitude but this will necessarily prove to be in some degree or other exclusive and partial in dealing with one's own self, whilst to be partial or exclusive in accounting for

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one's own desires or capacities is the very source of every human evil whatever. When one wills in a Napoleonic way one is excluding the better parts of one's own nature, the deeper layers of life where tears are plentiful and mere powers cannot take root, but where it is that one's true happiness—it being nothing but happiness on the earth, whose important resources are always powers with tears—finds its first supply as well as its constant reinforcement and purification.

As to "imagination," I should think that Napoleon was not so "lively" in the possession of such a quality that he could exchange the qualities of a conqueror and emperor for those of a lover of life or rather of a great egoist. Is it possible for one who is very sensitive not merely to the outward but also and rather to the inward kinds of stimuli—for to be sensitive is a necessary condition for being "imaginative"—to take pleasure and pride in striving to become a conqueror and emperor in the mere response to the outward kinds of stimuli? The truth

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remains, however, that when one is earnest in responding to one's own inner and inmost kinds of stimuli to their complete fulfilment one is naturally brought to meet one's own outer and outmost kinds of stimuli in their requirement of satisfaction. One's greatest happiness in satisfying one's outer and outmost kinds of stimuli is, thus, to be found only when one satisfies them on behalf of one's inner and inmost kinds of stimuli which need fulfilment. When one acts rather in response to the outer than to the inner kinds of stimuli one may still obtain a considerable amount of reality for oneself, especially if one has a certain power as in the case of Napoleon. But even then if what one thus obtains, with all its showy qualities and quantities, is viewed by an intelligent self it will be found really remaining but little affected by one's personal influence. It will be found asserting in an essential manner its own existence as if there had happened no new force which spells one's own converting power. And here it

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is that a Napoleonic life, however mighty and glorious it may appear to us, when we are half-awakened to our desires, is really an unbearably lonely and detestable life, especially when it is triumphant and at the height of its success. This is the case with those who are sensitive and therefore imaginative not merely with regard to the outward but even more so with regard to the inward kinds of stimuli. This possibility of loneliness, loneliness in conquering and in victory, however, is not so insignificant for anyone who may even be disposed in an extremely outward manner, as, indeed, to laugh at it in the interest of a delight in conquering and in victory. For such a state of loneliness implies that one is in possession of a less intense degree of the same delight which one could possess in a more intense degree if one had acted rather in response to the inward than to the outward kinds of stimuli. To be a conqueror and emperor in a Napoleonic way may simply seem for a well-awakened self to be a buyer of "goods"

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according to their mere magnitude and appearance, when it is at bottom the worth of inner quality that makes magnitude and appearance valuable. To laugh at the worth or worthlessness of inner quality in the mere interest of magnitude and appearance is to laugh at roots in the mere interest of blossoms and fruit. To be imaginative but simply or rather towards the outward than towards the inward is in effect barren and destructive, and in itself—this is most fatal—of the worst possible taste, whilst life is after all a matter of taste. Nothing could be more immediate and intimate in marking off the level of a life than the taste meant by that life. An evolution or a progress is of no meaning unless it means a change towards a betterment of taste in itself and in its conditions. Taste is, in the most moderate terms, what we always find as the element for and in and by which we are moving. What we do or are betrays our taste far more than any other thing. The mere utterance “I like,” or “I don’t like,” when it is uttered sin-

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cerely, is stronger than any other power in the world. It can only be overcome by superior forms of the same nature. Taste, however, is never a merely subjective matter nor ever an isolated fact but an experience which is possible under co-operation of the various factors which matter to a life; and it is subject to the systematic determination of the whole of existence with all its relevancies and irrelevancies. Thus it is that when we interest ourselves in helping and furthering the cause of taste we meet all the problems of life and civilisation. The mere effort to better taste does not suffice. We must raise all the conditions of life, or elevate them so that they conform to the taste whose betterment is the final goal of our efforts. When Christianity did not attempt to abolish slavery, in spite of its practice as well as its theory of brotherhood (and it was not to Christianity but to the general ruin of the social system during the dark ages that we should give credit for the abolition of slavery), or when "render therefore unto Cæsar the

things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's " was uttered more to be fruitful in deeds as well as in words all through the development of Christianity than as a kind of tact on a particular occasion by Jesus himself, the taste, for which Christians are credited, was not quite safe from having some day to be overcome or to be drastically reinterpreted by the other kind of or superior taste which is operative in modern minds. The taste for which Christianity stood was not at all of the kind which is " rough of grain and common in fibre " ; it was quite otherwise, thanks mainly to the infinitely fine and delicate feeling of its Founder himself. But the taste for which Christianity stood was not quite aware of the great necessity of maintaining itself by entering into connection with the total-system of existence whose very nucleus it had to form. It had raised itself above the world, leaving the latter to be governed by the taste which was, in truth, " rough of grain and common

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in fibre.” But as that was really impossible, the actual world, in which alone any kind of taste can be present and operative, has ended by leaving the higher taste at the mercy of the lower. A taste which is higher, and which aspires after a higher, can only attain its end by elevating the lower to a level consistent with its own. It can only do so by bringing itself into one whole system with the surrounding world and all its actual forces, so that such a taste may assert itself through the elevation of the entire perspective of various grades of tastes. One of the issues which follow here is that religion, in order to be worth having at all, must most emphatically be politics in one of religion’s important aspects. To put it in a very figurative form, Jesus must become a Napoleon and God must be paid tribute to. And all this requires us to be ever more lively in our imagination, not merely with the world outside, but likewise, and even more particularly, not merely with that *inside* either.

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As to enterprise, I should remark that when one is most enterprising one will not disregard but try to conform as far as possible to these inner and inmost wants which it is fruitful to satisfy both for the sake of oneself and also for the sake of one's fellows. Then we should not be content with a mere rearrangement of things which would produce a formal increase in our own magnitude at the expense of others and their possessions, without at the same time adding anything to the absolute worth of things. To attempt to make oneself greater by making one's neighbour smaller, or to exist by driving him out of existence, will seem too poor an enterprise for one who is enterprising to the highest of his power. It is, moreover, at bottom impossible. It results in making oneself smaller and driving oneself out of existence. A man increases in value when the world increases in value and owes that increase to him. Napoleon, to give an example, was successful as long as he availed himself of the French people for the apparent

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purpose of giving them freedom against the tyranny of the aristocracy. He was then quite properly increasing in value. He turned round to fail, however, as soon as he began to exploit the French nation in order to be tyrannical towards other nations. His decrease in value in his later years was nothing but another and wrong application of that same principle by whose right application he had risen in his earlier period. Or, to give another example, Athens had her miserable end because she deliberately abstained from giving her own ideal value of liberty to her neighbours, knowing that in that liberty was found the source of her initial prosperity. An enterprise which deserves the name of a positive value must always be synthetic in its form and purport. It must be synthetic in the sense that one tries to solve a problem by satisfying or mastering as comprehensively as possible the wants and interests relevant to that problem. And therefore such an enterprise must be transcendent in its relation to each

of the conflicting, and thus component, forces of that problem. It must be transcendent in the sense that the very interest of such an enterprise does not itself conflict or come into rivalry with any of these forces or interests, but rather guides them all towards one goal so that each of them can find its proper place for fulfilment. Such an enterprise must be invention and not mere rearrangement. This is so because a truly moral life must always be creative, for only thus can it transcend all the conflicting forces by giving them a synthetic form of realisation which is not given in the same way as those forces are, but must be added by the man himself in order to get rid of them. It would be a disgrace for any highly enterprising mind if it could not by its own enterprise bring about a progress or a happiness in the fortunes of its nearer or its farther neighbours as well as of its own personality. And war should be the last resort for such a mind to turn to, because to exist by destroying our neighbours instead

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of converting them is too far removed from any synthetic invention. On the other hand, however, it is just a synthetic invention that a highly enterprising mind is anxious to make when it meets a difficulty between itself and its neighbours in the form of rivalry or of any opposing relation whatever.

If the objects with which we have to deal in the interest of our self-preservation in the broadest sense of the term are so devoid of consciousness that they can hardly feel any moral sorrow or joy by our dealings, such as land in the case of our making roads or cornfields out of it by forming and deforming it at our sole liberty, we are right and good merely in proportion as those dealings bring about progress and happiness for ourselves alone. But, when the objects are to some degree or other more developed in their consciousness, we must take into our consideration in our dealings with them what the moral pain or joy on their own part then would be. And we must act with the intention of working for the best possible

synthetic, or, if you like, constructive form of life which satisfies both our moral interests and theirs, as when we have to do with fellow human beings. One of the chief reasons why we have warfare in any form, whether between individuals or between groups, arises in most cases from our leaving the forces which are latent in us and in nature around us untouched; while it is only by turning them to account that the very axiom of a true morality can be fulfilled at all. For this axiom is nothing other than an invention which in practice amounts to a synthetic realisation of interests. To put it in another way, war is so often due to our endeavour to solve the difficulty of self-preservation or self-assertion by a new *arrangement* of the "goods" which are actually in existence rather than by a new *production* of "goods" which are not yet in existence. Such an endeavour we can hardly credit as being an enterprise.

The fatal inability of so-called egoism and altruism lies in the fact that both of them

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are, each in an opposite direction, the mere rearrangement of values and realities and not a creation. To bring others—the nearer or the farther neighbours—into existence or into fuller existence by bringing oneself into non-existence or into less existence is the theory as well as the practice of altruism, whilst just the reverse is the case of egoism. No new creation of reality or no new increase of value could be brought about by any such mere shifting or replacing things existent from one to the other. Such processes have little to do with the progress of humanity or of the universe. An action is, after all, evaluated by the progress it produces upon the *whole* whose organic part it is. But the creativeness which is synthetic in its relation to the interests that it is incumbent on us to fulfil is only possible when we are alive both to our inmost as well as to our most external needs. One would like absolutely to remain faithful to one's inmost shame and pride. But one would not like for anything to lose one's interest even at the

farthest frontier of one's existence. Thus and thus alone it is that we are impelled to invent in a moral sense. And here we can hardly lay too much weight on the usefulness and significance of the sense of necessity.

We are in the most extreme degree, and at one and the same time, attracted by the two powers which set towards both poles of our own existence. This is the only state in which we can be alive to ourselves and to what life—a truly moral life—means. Our most external interests claim, with an irresistible tenacity, to be our inmost interests, whilst our inmost interests on their part do just the same. This is where we become creative in our treatment of the problems presented to us as moral agents. When we act for our outward interest at the expense of our inward, or when we act in the opposite way, we are never in the right condition to be possessed by that strong sense of necessity which alone can make us productive. When it is said that a lion would never attack his prey a second time in case he had failed in

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his first attack, but go away in an ashamed manner, or that an eagle would never touch a corpse, but hunt with resolute perseverance after flying creatures to appease its hunger, there is something suggestive in all this in connection with the issue under our consideration. The lion otherwise might not have procured that wonderful strength which makes his first attack almost surely the final blow ; and the eagle, if it could reduce its insatiable pride, might not have made of itself the master-power of the air. They are, of course, tenacious towards their outward gain, but not at the expense of their inward imagination, and thus it might be that they could create for themselves such power. Necessity within and without, giving full scope for the realisation of both its aspects at the same time ; or, to speak in the spirit of the foregoing, to be ever more hungry both for consequences and conscience, and to be determined to satisfy both at once ; or, again, to live the most external kind of life in the consciousness of living the

inmost kind of life, and vice versa—to learn all this is so important for us who have been long accustomed to think and live our life not in its *natural wholeness* from which alone any true idealism, either in theory or in practice, can issue, but in its artificial separation to which we owe most of the social as well as the individual diseases and evils of our age

CHAPTER IV

THE TWO FUNDAMENTAL IMPULSES OF LIFE : PRIDE AND LOVE

IN connection with the two dimensions of life as well as the two factors in practical judgment we can hardly miss paying attention to two agents in life which are so significant that life was largely in the past and still is either made or unmade by their very power. They are, indeed, two such wonderful forces within life that there is hardly any other force for us human beings which is more intimately known, and yet, on the other hand, more imperfectly understood. They might well be called the most obvious of all facts, and, at the same time, the most subtle of all mysteries. They are, namely, Love, on the one hand, and Pride, on the other.

We may think that Love is everything and the supreme value of values in case we are actually and also intensely possessed by Love in some form or other. In a similar way, we may easily be persuaded that what is most priceless, what must be kept sacred at any cost, is Pride. We feel this in particular in those moments when we are deeply offended or in some manner or other actually brought to a consciousness of shame. I, however, am fully convinced that only rare individuals can be affected in their formation of concepts by their own positive observation and experiment rather than by traditional authority. And I am well aware of the fact, too, that this inability of most men and women to make or unmake concepts in conformity with their own personal and, therefore, practical experience is self-assertive, because it signifies less an inability than an ability of inferior type. Moreover it is harmful, particularly when they have to deal with such time-honoured and time-dishonoured concepts as Love and Pride. But

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we must not overlook the fact that there are sometimes ideas amongst us such as have been for thousands of years held up in honour by being alleged as demanding homage from us but not so much in action and practice as in words and pretension. And, on the other hand, we must recognise that some ideas have been for so long a time kept in a state of unpopularity, but not so much by our will and conduct as by our irresponsible sentiment and unreflective thought. Sometimes it is the case that such so-called exalted ideas could have been so exalted by us, as they have historically been, more on account of our lack of understanding than on account of the inherent value of the ideas themselves. Man deifies things too soon, just as he damns things too hastily. Man does so because he cannot, or does not, reason by himself, but listens rather to others who are large perhaps in numbers, or else though few yet enjoy so great a prestige that he readily gives ear to whatever they assure him to be true or untrue. There is sometimes even

a kind of well-meaning cunning perpetrated by the few superiors to make what they would like to propagate appear to their inferiors or the world at large as an unquestionable truth by vesting it with a sort of oracular power. And what once thus preoccupied the mind of the world at large ceases for a long time to be an object of study or investigation but becomes an object of worship and bigotry. One of the most grandiose examples in this connection is of course afforded by the development and influence of primitive Christianity right up to the medieval period and even to the present day. Or you could find another and smaller example in so-called Neo-Kantians, in the direction of their outlook upon Duty, Conscience, and so forth. When a concept is improperly deified it incurs a double loss. On the one hand, it puts an end to its own improvement because it is no longer within the range of criticism. And, on the other hand, any supposed contrary concept to it has to be improperly condemned. In order that you

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may make a despot of yourself, you must certainly make a slave of your neighbour. A despot will not progress because he is too much spoilt to be educated. Just so, a slave cannot obtain the full development of his inborn capacities because he has too little air and light—*i.e.* freedom—for being cultivated. We are too often apt to make a concept of an evil by stunting a growing reality which would have made of itself a good if it had been given opportunities for self-realisation. It might have made of itself even a greater good than the existing good which is supposed to be the diametrical opponent of it if only equal opportunities for self-realisation had been given to both. The existing good might have been so feeble and unable as it had been just because it had neglected the ideal emancipation of its supposed opponent which is too deep-rooted in our nature to be eradicated or suppressed for any considerable length of time by any means, but could only be moulded into a successful form in order that we might live

and live well at all. Its opponent may turn out to have really been its own truer friend—or, indeed, a truer self even—than that which it has taken to be the truest. This is quite as probable as the fact that our felt need is not always our real need, as a patient often experiences at the hands of his physician. It is very difficult for us to believe in, or even to listen to, a new theory or practice suggested by a new physician with regard to a disease for which a different remedy has long been advised by our familiar physician. We should not be surprised or disappointed too much at the mechanical conservatism of people in connection with some vital problems of the soul and things appertaining thereto. Even when the nature and circumstances of a disease, in the case of the soul, have greatly changed, people would hardly listen to a new remedy. They prefer to adhere blindly to the old remedy which might have been good for the disease in its old nature and circumstances but futile or destructive for the changed nature and

circumstances of the disease. For the same nature and circumstances of a disease there can still be a better remedy discoverable than the customary one. Far more must it be so when the nature and circumstances of a disease have themselves considerably changed.

I recognise the important place of love in the life of mankind, and even in the world below man. It is rather trite to refer to the maternal, sexual, or any other form of love, which is obviously present in us as a very powerful force. Maternal affection, while it is most positively characterised by the ideal quality of love which requires pure self-sacrifice and devotion, is no artificial product but a primitive, natural force. A mother can but submit to it. It is altogether too inherent a reality to be ousted by any external force. It is almost the mother herself. Sexual love is much more complex and intermingled than the maternal. But there is in it an undeniable element of self-sacrifice and devotion which constitutes the ideal

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quality of love. This element in sexual love, in spite of some other elements co-operative with it, which are more or less remote from the strictly defined character of love, is, in normal cases, quite an exalted and stable reality. There are, of course, many other forms of love than these two, which also confirm love as a reality of ever-widening growth in man's nature. To take advantage of every chance for developing and cultivating this side of man's nature is of supreme importance. For it forms quite an inner side of man's nature. In our present application, to be inner means to be a more basic force or tendency of one action or movement any outer side of which is more dependent upon the inner than this latter is upon the former. To give realisation to the inner is to liberate and feed the tree at its roots.

The question, however, remains whether love is the sole or most fundamental tendency in man's nature or not. Let us suppose, for the moment, that love is so. It then follows that our greatest stress in moral as well as

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religious education in all its forms must be laid nowhere but upon the awakening and invigorating of this tendency in ourselves. Because it is such an unrivalled, deep-seated natural force within us, we cannot fail too miserably in turning it to account so that it actually may play the part of the supreme, leading ideal force within ourselves. To fail too miserably means here to be even more unsuccessful than if we had believed in some other tendency within ourselves besides that of love which is basic and, therefore, capable of being so turned to account as to play the part of the supreme, leading ideal force within ourselves rather than love, and had acted upon this belief. What enables us to form a decision upon this question must be, first of all, individual as well as historical facts with their undeceivable inner force of necessity. In spite of all its formal swearing by the doctrine of love and humility, what is most characteristic of modern tendencies has no doubt been an increasing confidence of man in himself. At the dawn of modern

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thought a continental philosopher—Spinoza—indulged “the love of God” in a purely contemplative and submissive way. To love God was for him to see the world as it was, and nothing further was required by him. Every event has its cause. To see any event whatever in the light of its cause is to rid ourselves of all passions, pleasurable as well as painful. Contentment by means of submission and resignation, enlightened in a way as these qualities were, was all that he could discover for the salvation of mankind. Still he was a modern man because, for him, there was no God transcendent to the world but immanent in it. God was for him the world itself in its complete nexus of causality, which ran through in a parallel way on both sides of the world—physical and spiritual—whose reality was conceived as One and as Substance. To have found God in the world and to have discovered Nature in Spirit was quite a merit of his—a merit which is modern. But what an unsatisfactory outlook upon life and the world was his when it had simply

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to understand how things came to be what they are ! What a cheap and unworthy contentment was it that could be brought about by knowing that things could not be better than they are ! What a humble part had been assigned to intellect when it had only to explain away any imperfection of the world by pointing to its natural course of happenings, so that it may disprove the *raison d'être* of every dissatisfaction !

What a contrast all this was over against the later development of modern thought in its main lines. It is interesting to glance at Kant on this point of view. He could no more allow himself to take the world as it was for its truest form of existence. Although he was anxious to safeguard the world of science against any attack of scepticism, his dominant interest was to affirm the world of ideals, which had real existence of its own, and for which the world of science was no more than a phenomenon. Freedom of will, the immortality of the soul and personality, and the existence of God, to

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prove the possibility and reality of these moral and religious qualities was what actuated him to affirm the foundation of the world of science. For to him perhaps even more than to Spinoza, the integrity of the world of causation and mechanism was undeniable, whilst his moral and religious resentment with the "given" actual world could not be quieted in such a negative way as Spinoza found available. The only way to get rid of the resentment was to confine the reign of natural law, which was indifferent to any moral or religious interest, to the world of time, space, causality, and so forth alone, so that we might suppose the world of moral or religious perfection to be possible and real purely by and for itself, that is, in spite of, and independently of, the former world. The truest world ceased to be the object of intellect but became solely the object of will. Will took precedence of intellect in value and reality. "Intellectual love of God" gave way to the "volitional love of God" as we might say. But just as

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for Spinoza that which intellect at its best could perform was to submit ideal qualities entirely to nature, so for Kant that which *Will* could perform was to defend itself from any influence of nature. The only true possible way of getting rid of any resentment or dissatisfaction with the present existing world, namely, to improve upon it, was still far removed from Kant, though much nearer than it was to Spinoza. It was with the pragmatic movement that this point of our own was first given any concentrated form of expression. For us as well as for any true pragmatist, there cannot be two worlds capable of being kept apart from each other or of being developed at the expense of one another. There is only one world for which we live and which we can improve. We as intellectual as well as volitional beings are assigned the task of improving upon the only given and possible world, which is *this* world. We are in possession of intellect so that we may know what to do by way of improving upon the existing world in which

we ourselves are placed. We are endowed with will power so that we may set our intellect to work for ourselves, whose interest is to improve upon the world, and so that we may carry out what our intellect has thus devised for ourselves in the form of an ideal. All this is the original meaning of will and intellect found throughout the entire scale of existence human as well as biological, and still remains their final meaning. To improve upon the world, a part of which we ourselves are, and outside which there is nothing, this and this alone can be our legitimate interest in the truest moral sense of the term. When Will took precedence of intellect, it really meant that the self took precedence of the not-self. Will, by its psychological nature, is essentially subjective. It has, of course, an objective element in it. The idea what to do, which is a necessary element in any form of will, is pre-eminently intellectual, and, therefore, objective. We must not, however, pass over the wide difference between this intellectual

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element in will and any idea or knowledge existing for or taken by itself. Knowledge as such is a mere reproduction, a copy, bringing about no change whatever on the part of the object. Whether a thing is known by one or not makes no difference whatever to the thing itself. A thing will be no more affected by being known than the moon or clouds are by being photographed. Intellect as such can very well serve for us to know what is in existence and how it has happened so to exist. This is perhaps the most immediate part for intellect to play. But, so far, the capability of intellect is to produce next to nothing in the world because what it does is to make one existence reflect upon another, leaving either the former or the latter existence in substance exactly as it is. Intellect, however, can as well serve for us to know how to change things in existence so that they may remove our present dissatisfaction or may give us a satisfaction greater than the present one. This is, no doubt, what intellect as a whole means to

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us as its possessors. Strictly speaking, we cannot know anything whatever without somehow or other, more or less, affecting the thing known. This is so because we are and can be never purely intellectual beings but appreciative and active. Our knowledge affects our appreciation, our appreciation affects our action, and our action affects the world at the point of the object known, or some other point which is anyhow bound up with the former point whether in a plain form of physical causation, or in a subtle and even a subtler form of organic or mental communication.

In our brief notice of the development of modern thought in its central tendency we have seen that we had started by submitting our will to our intellect ; that then we proceeded to integrate our will against our intellect by officially consecrating the former but really by shunning the latter ; and that now we are submitting our intellect to our will. The whole process precisely corresponds to the change of the relative

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position of our subjective self on the one hand, that stands by our will, and of our objective world on the other, that stands by our intellect. When you submit your will to your intellect, and submit thus your self to the world, as Spinoza did, there is no possibility for the world to be improved upon. When you cut off your will from your intellect, and cut off thus your self from the world, as Kant did, which is impossible under any pretext, there is also no possibility for the world to be improved upon. But the world, for which our intellect stands to tell us what it is, is so related to ourselves that we can never perfect ourselves without improving upon it.

The reason why we have will and intellect, or why there are the self and the world, is at length to be sought for in the direction in which these latter, which constitute the sole reality, have to be improved upon. Of course, we are not neglecting the part of emotion in connection with will and intellect. If we take will as somehow different from

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emotion, we do so by assigning to the former the part of a vehicle with its locomotive engine, which is instrumental to the driver, that is emotion, and the frontal lamp of which is intellect. In this case will is rather represented as a power or energy which is not far removed from an external or physical kind of force. It is hired by and not grown from emotion. It is no more personal, or no less mechanical, than intellect, although the distinction of intellect and will still remains that the former is static and formal whilst the latter is dynamic and substantial. If we take the term Will as representing the whole assets of mental life minus intellect, we do so by seeing in such a will the entire self over against the rest of the world, which is represented by intellect. In this case, will is rather the direct sequel of emotion. Emotion, itself being the evaluating and appreciating function, tends necessarily either to remove what is unsatisfying or to promote what is satisfying. The moment, however, it does so, there comes into being will as the

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development of the emotion. Emotion is most central. Had it not been for emotion, there could not have been any will but only mechanical force. On the other hand, however, emotion would be helpless and would evaluate or appreciate in vain or be itself violated by external forces if there were no will-power at the service of the emotion. Valuation steps into action, which is nothing but another name for will, and which amounts to the remoulding of reality or to the creation of a new reality. In emotion the improvement of the world is first fermented because it is emotion that evaluates the world. The victory of will over intellect in modern thought and life, as was heralded by Kant's proclamation of the "primacy of will over intellect," and was prosecuted by the so-called voluntaristic movement in its numerous forms of campaigns, ranging from the most sober psychological research and experiment right up to the most enthusiastic philosophical manœuvre, signifies nothing less than the rapid advance of mankind in the

realisation of the truth of improving upon the world as well as upon itself. Fichte's metaphysics of moral will, or Schopenhauer's metaphysics of natural will, or Wundt's and James's, as it were, concerted establishment of voluntaristic psychology, or Nietzsche's prophetic announcement of "will to power" as well as of strong personality, or at latest the outcry of the Pragmatic Canon from the New World—all this shows us in the strongest light the general and growing tendency of modern thought and life towards the right adjustment of man to the world, which is no other than the improvement upon the latter by the former. Meanwhile we are of course aware of the fact that the English practical wisdom, notably expressed by Bacon in his proposition that "Knowledge is Power," or even more notably by J. S. Mill in his individualistic utilitarian and inductive methods of dealing with problems, along with the French directness and positiveness, as the latter in Comte, and the former in Descartes' *Cogito ergo sum*, and

lately in Bergson's *élan vital* found its typical expression, does no less effectually speak for this same tendency than the above-mentioned events do. However much we might be, as I really am, unsatisfied with modern voluntarism in its rather having let the will as *means-value* overshadow the emotion as *end-value*, it has still, on the whole, so stupendously intensified and empowered the improving agency of the world, *i.e.* the self. Moreover, there can be an excuse for modern voluntarism having rather overrun the *end-value* of emotion in the zeal of articulating the active nature of the self over against the world as well as its exponent intellect if we consider its historical position not only as reactionary and supplementary to the ancient and the early modern intellectualism, as is commonly admitted, but also as turning round the medieval emotionalism. Indeed, for Socrates, men had only to know what the Good and the Bad, or the Right and the Wrong, were in order to do the Good and the Right and be freed

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from any moral failure. Or for Plato, the best and ideal life was to contemplate the World of Ideas, which was the only true world, by means of pure reason, which was the only true self. Spinoza's metaphysics and Descartes' epistemology as the assumption of *innate ideas* speak sufficiently for early modern intellectualism. In another direction, but going likewise to extremes, for the primitive and the later medieval Christians, as very likely for the Founder of Christianity himself, *heart* was almost everything. Taking place after such absorbingly or exclusively intellectual and emotional periods, and being provided with an unprecedentedly abounding vigour, it has been quite natural for the modern period to have characterised itself as the conative period which was as yet left undeveloped. Intellectualism when self-sufficing coincides with shallow optimism. The limit of Hellenism, if any, lay first of all in this point. Intellect, taken by itself, knows only what the world is. Either will or emotion under the supreme

rule of such an intellect has but to adjust itself so as to be contented with the present state of things and circumstances. Emotion may only so move as to find the maximum possible values in the existent world instead of creating them out of the latter. Will may only so act as to keep or bring the existing forces into harmony with one another, instead of giving them a higher synthetic form of existence. Thus it was that improvement or creativeness could hardly as yet have been the key-note of the Ancient Greeks, but the enjoyment of life and the harmonious outlook upon the world. Mere intellect could not see or apperceive chaos in the world and imperfection in man, not only because intellect as such is neutral but because intellect, when left to itself, takes advantage of accomplishing the ideal unity upon things in its own purely formal fashion. The result is precocious perfection both in man as a microcosm and in the world as a macrocosm. Unity remains our ideal. It makes itself felt to any type of mental activity as its

fundamental justification and endeavour. Logical activity can no more act free from this than the æsthetic and the ethical activity can. But logical unity alone never suffices because the ideal unity must be substantial. In order to bring about the ideal unity of things in a substantial manner, however, emotion must not be a servant but the master of intellect. Emotion must freely respond to the result of intellect, which is the present world, by sincerely evaluating the latter. Emotion must, moreover, be even so free or powerful as to direct intellect to work in accordance with the results of emotion, that is, *valuation*. Intellect must serve emotion in such a way as to contrive for the latter how to effect its command or denial in the form of a like or a dislike in the world which is the domain of intellect. We get thus will in its complete form, which alone enables us to bring about the substantial unity of things. It is with the coming of this form of will into being that man as the improving agency of the world comes first into being.

To realise all the importance attached to this plain matter, however, is for us hardly as yet an outgrown story, but quite an incomplete and living programme. Even Hegel, who lived so near us in time, we are compelled to treat as an intellectualist, though of the most modern type. He took the world as it was for an existence entirely rational. We, on the other hand, take the world as it is to be still very imperfect. For us the rational world is not a fact but an *ideal*. It is not yet given to us in its completeness nor has it yet been fully attained by us. None the less, we, who are awakened, not only as knowing and thinking beings, but also, and even essentially, as feeling, appreciating, conative and active beings, are firmly convinced of the possibility and necessity of turning our Ideal into fact. We believe in an improving power on the part of ourselves; and in an improvable nature on the part of the world. We are not satisfied with the present world, as the ancient Greeks were, because we are set free emotionally.

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This culture of emotion we owe, of course, in a very considerable measure to the birth and growth of Christianity, which succeeded Hellenism. Christianity, however, was absorbingly emotional and was hardly anything more. With the advent of Christianity, men became keenly aware of the untruthfulness, ugliness, and viciousness which flooded the present life and world which were taken by the early Greeks for the embodiment of *Kalokagathos*. Man ceased, with Christianity, to be any longer able to dance and sing and laugh in the laudation of all natural gifts whether within or without. The physical world was no more the perpetual concert of heavenly bodies as a Greek sage, Pythagoras, had held it to be, but it became a mere transient existence doomed to an apocalyptic cataclysm. The political world which had meant for the triumphant Athenians nothing less than the necessary moral means for liberating man's capacities, and which, therefore, had been such an important concern for Plato and Aristotle, became with

the primitive Christians nothing more than a legal bondage imposed upon man by Cæsar whose domain had no share in God's domain, which was the sole object of man's moral devotion. The psychical world which had, in the Hellenic period, been intimately kissing and embracing the physical as well as the political world, began, with the dawning of Christianity, to turn its back upon these latter with a resentful and despairing disillusion. Life has, no doubt, been immensely deepened by all these Christian movements. Man learnt with Christianity to *feel*, but what else? Have we ever learnt with Christianity to *do* anything besides to pray? The primitive and the later official Christianity have hardly ever tried either to destroy or to reform the political world which has seldom reached the standard compatible with their own. The indifference or even tacit approval of medieval Christianity towards slavery, which was glaringly contrary to the doctrine of brotherhood, is but an example. Every Christian country

which has, on the one hand, continually insisted upon humility as well as love for one's enemy, has never shrunk from waging war at the instance of honour or interest, on the other hand. The primitive Christians fervently hoped for, and believed in, the coming of the *great day*. They would have been more successful if they had done their best to cause such a day to come. Mere repentance and prayer, however earnest these might be, were altogether means too insufficient for bringing about the End which they wished to attain. The Kingdom of God as well as the preliminary destruction of the existing world were presented to the early Christians not as an object of will but of mere emotional intellect. The coming of those events was worth wishing for, and, therefore, was expected. The only logic which could be available for the early Christians was thus inevitably revelation, miracle, and supernatural power. What is worth having as an actual fact, but is not in existence, means, for us who believe so much

in will as we do, that it should as the only possible way to it be brought forward by means of the creative activity of will. Revelation, miracle, supernatural power—all these ideas cannot but mean, for us who have such confidence in ourselves as we do really have, certain vices which we might define in the terms of ignorance, idleness, irresponsibility, and, above all these qualities, willing slavery. Slavery, if it is a vice, is no less a vice when it is imposed upon the nearest reality which is self than when it is imposed upon a farther-lying reality which may happen to be one's neighbour. The doctrine of love, if only it had been backed up by the parallel doctrine of pride instead of humility, would have effected an incomparably greater good upon the fate of mankind. Even during the medieval period one virtue which governed so widely and deeply man's moral ideal as well as practice was *chivalry*, which had no share in humility but had the largest affinity with pride. It might, indeed, be a very desirable thing for us

that we should have our neighbours as the embodiment of love and humility, so long as we are not courageous enough to fight for the spiritual preservation and development of self, which necessarily demands an invigorating atmosphere. No one ever was so willing to have himself as to have his neighbours as the embodiment of love and humility. When one encourages the virtues of love and humility, we often find that he does not mean for himself so much as for others. The very act betrays a good deal of self-assertion which disproves what he preaches. What is disappointing to us as weaklings is, however, that love and humility can never go together. In order to love, one must first of all be able to perfect, or, to help the perfection of, the object which he has in view. Successful self-assertion is the sole way in which one can ever love others. The essence of self-assertion is, however, most characteristically pride. Humility tends to be nothing. How can we love by means of nothing ? By means of humility,

one might be most successful in obtaining pity. In order to be pitied humility might be the first important quality. Just as an absolute master and a conscientious slave can never do without each other, humility and pity can never be apart. It is by pride that one can either love or be loved. When one yields to humility or pity, he is no more in possession of freedom or of dignity. It was really nothing wonderful that medieval Christianity and medieval slavery could march hand in hand. The ascendancy of will in modern psychology and philosophy on their voluntaristic side, on which we have been dwelling, is but an instance coincident with, or expressive of, the awakening of pride. The rise of science and technics, which also characterises modern times, is but another aspect of the same tendency as that of which voluntarism partakes. Instead of waiting for revelation, which is not only vain in reality but also a moral shame, we discover the laws pertaining to nature so that we may adapt ourselves to it and conquer it.

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We adapt ourselves to nature so that we may make it adaptable to ourselves. This whole process constitutes our scientific and technical activity. There is not only no need but likewise no possibility for us to believe in a miracle, because we believe in our own intellect whose result is science, as well as in our own will whose result is technics, which follows by way of accomplishing the former as the only possible way of changing nature in accordance with our wishes. The Kingdom of God as well as the preliminary destruction of the unworthy world, if it is desirable for us to have these as actual happenings, become the object of our scientific and technical activity so that they may be created by ourselves. Although we believe in our own will and intellect as the sole agencies capable of carrying out our emotional endeavour we place no limitation whatever to that capability of our will and intellect which answers the emotion. This is why there is no need for us to believe in a miracle, even apart from our knowledge that

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a miracle is an impossibility. We are not only too intelligent to believe in a miracle, but also, and primarily, too proud to do so because a miracle is supposed to be beyond our reach of explanation, and, consequently, cannot be made an object of our scientific activity, which enables us to create it by our technical activity. Supernatural power, if there be any, cannot but be human power. There can never be a superhuman power, because any but human power counts as a natural power as soon as and so long as a human power becomes and continues alive to itself. This self-consciousness of man as a power is what makes us capable of pride and of creative activity. It is with the growth of these qualities in man that he improves in morality. The history of modern thought and practice chronicles on the whole the development of pride and creative activity in man, and thus the improvement of morality. We can never account for the rise of democracy, for instance, unless we know that its secret truth is to supplant all

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the accidental values such as birth-value, property-value, race-value, etc., by the essential value which is Personal Value. This personal value, however, will never be understood if we remain blind to its core, which consists of Pride on the one hand, and of creative activity on the other. Indeed, just as the strength or the growing tendency of democracy lies in its appreciation of pride and of creative activity, so does the weakness or the declining tendency of the same, in its want of appreciation of the cause of personal value, as Nietzsche has warned us. Democracy has been growing because it had a belief in the emancipation of persons from their social yokes so that they might live on their own intrinsic value. It was man's pride and creative activity which demanded democracy. If a democracy ends by leveling men down, it is owing to the very cause by which it has risen that it sinks. We moderns are not ashamed but proud of labour, or at least pretend to be so. This change of attitude towards labour, to give

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another incidental example, accords also with the augmentation of pride and of creative activity. Our pride does not allow us to be avoidably dependent on others, nor does our creative activity let us forgo any possible improvement in our own circumstances.

Love alone may suffice within one's own family. It ceases to be a predominant power as soon as you enter a drawing-room or go out into the street. A step out of home and into the world, how faint is the impulse of love, on the one hand, and how sharp-edged is the sense of honour or of personal dignity, on the other! Nearly two thousand years after we had bowed to the teaching of love and humility we are fighting by far the greatest of all known wars mainly because of love of pride and hatred of humility. After all the causes of this war have been scrutinised, the crudest cause would no doubt be found to be national pride based, as could not be otherwise, on personal pride. Austria was proud enough to make good her felt humilia-

tion by dictating the terms of the indemnity upon Serbia in defiance of the latter's pride. Serbia was proud enough to accept the alternative of war instead of the dictated terms which meant for her an unbearable humiliation. So most of the subsequent belligerents had, each in its own situation, a convincing reason that to abstain from the war was itself humiliation, or at least to have the result of humiliation. The pain of, or fear for, national and, consequently, personal humiliation accounts, above all other factors, for the motive of the few principal belligerents. A bare economic interest does not explain the hardest core of the heart either of Germany or of England. The mere name of Great Britain or of the German Emperor carries enough concerning what they are. The one is an established pride; the other is pride in the making and at its strong momentum. Between themselves the Balkan States are also very eager to create pride and throw off humility. Europe is now moving by the misguided impulse of pride rather than

by any other force. For the sake of **Kultur**, or for the sake of **Justice**, of **Liberty**, etc.—all these apologies are more or less shadowy justifications hired for reinforcing a primary conviction of national pride. When, however, we say that Europe is now moving by the misguided impulse of pride, we do not mean anything in contrast to other continents or to past times. Peace by chance may no more be valuable than war by accident because either of them is no moral merit. Some of the leading belligerents may deserve our higher appreciation than some of the countries which have followed in the war because the sense of responsibility which is so important in morals may be more perfect in the former than in the latter. To plunge into the war by an irresistible impetus of love of pride or hatred of humiliation may sometimes be less blameable or more praiseworthy than to fight or not to fight by a superficial calculation. There is nothing wrong in loving pride and hating humiliation because the root of this instinct goes as

deep as human nature itself can possibly go. We have to cultivate it, and by so doing alone are we in a position to realise a higher and even the highest form of life.

But when we classify human beings according to nationality alone, and fight one nationality against another, setting the personal moral values at naught, how poorly cultivated is our pride ! Why should we side with even the meanest creatures so that we might deprive even the noblest characters of their existence, merely on account of community and difference in some external circumstances rather than in any genuine moral interest, if we were allowed to reflect upon our pride ? It is always a shame when we help a more accidental value at the expense of a more essential value. A true pride can never exist apart from the sense of personal, moral value. If we have to go on our destined way of love of pride and hatred of humiliation as we are obliged to do, what is incumbent upon us to perform is, first of all, never to have a friend except

as a moral friend and never to have an enemy except as a moral enemy. Or, you may find that the earth is too small for any cultivated pride to divide it into sections so that we may love only one of them at the expense of others. To penetrate all the relations in which we may be involved, by the one principle of personal, moral value, is the standing condition of a true pride. When we estimate a mechanical value such as State, or a geographical value such as Country, or a biological value such as Race, even at the expense of, or more highly than, the moral value whose permanent abode is a *person*, we are in truth in a condition of gross humiliation which we may by ignorance feel as pride. A true pride is always a pride in a personal value which is the nucleus of moral value. A true pride is thus always a pride in a *moral* value, whatever external form it may assume. Colour, language, soil, modes of dressing, eating and drinking—all such natural and customary assets can never be rivals, much less masters, of a good will

or of a noble character, no matter under whatever kind of skin it dwells or through whatever kind of language it expresses itself. What is most precious is moral value. We have to live for the sake of this moral value. A pride which is directed to anything but moral value is a misguided pride which is in fact a humiliation.

Pride is the principle of life, and inversely humility is the principle of death. When our pride is properly guided, everything good can come out of it alone. Humiliation is complete when we die or kill others not on account of any personal, moral value but on account of, somehow or other, impersonal and, therefore, natural or mechanical values. State, nationality, customs, traditions—all these have full justification for their existence, but only so long as they minister to the need of our personal, moral value. A healthy life and a sound society are only possible on the foundation of a justly directed and so emancipated pride of ourselves. A socialism which aims at the mere

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material welfare of most members of the community, and neglects the excellence of quality which is bound to be always rare, can never entirely succeed because it contradicts the general and fundamental tendency in man's nature, which is not only to hate humiliation but also to love pride. Free competition, for instance, will never entirely fail to prevail so long as it can give more encouragement and incentive to our creative activity, which is only another aspect of our pride, than an equally allotting mechanical arrangement can possibly do. On the other hand, however, how dwarfed is our pride when we believe in a few superiors because of wealth, birth, rank, rather than of moral qualities such as ethical, logical, æsthetic, and truly religious capacities and merits. To live under the conditions of equal opportunity and try to excel others by our own personal, creative activity, which benefits both ourselves and others, is a natural step for an enlightened pride to take. An individualism which craves for liberty by

mastering as much as possible economic, political, and military power for oneself or for one's own country, without rather more primarily being anxious to produce cultural good, which at once glorifies the initiative person or nation and elevates others, can but result from the absence of a true great pride. Nothing could be even more self-humiliating than egoism and imperialism in a popular sense. To be superior or supreme in navy and army, or in governmental organisation alone, and not in scientific discovery, technical invention, or in artistic creation, will never come to be a temptation for a nation which knows the right orientation of pride. For the value of any national as well as individual defence rests upon what is defended; and the price of law is settled by what it secures. Neither defence nor law can ever be an End in itself. In either case the End remains as facilitating the growth of life and the creation of new values. It is by culture and not by force that a nation or an

individual may most successfully dominate the world. Militarism, diplomacy, or commercialism, as guiding principles of the foreign policy of a nation, may superficially and temporarily prove to be triumphant. But they will soon turn out to be self-humiliating principles, especially in a world where human bonds are realised even on their low level at the present time, and where consequently man has recognised that the centre of all values resides in a person and in persons, and not in regulating principles such as nationality, or race-distinction. It is confined to crudely sensuous and material values alone that one can enjoy at the expense of, or indifferently to, others. Eating and drinking can hardly satisfy the hunger or pleasure of any one but the man who actually eats and drinks. Houses and clothes may perhaps appease the æsthetic demand of a spectator if only they are beautifully made; but this must not be at the expense of more urgent human interests and also not through mere personal vanity. Even the person of a

wife one can appreciate in an exclusively individual way only so far as some tactual appreciation such as, for instance, kissing is concerned. The values appealing to our visual or aural senses are not monopolised even by the most jealous husband. He is rather anxious to let as many men as possible hear her musical voice or see her beautiful face and figure. But tactual sense is as a rule supposed to be an inferior type of sense in comparison with the visual or the aural. The visual and the aural senses are not only more far-reaching for our practical purposes than the tactual, but are likewise more adequate to our æsthetic purposes. The higher a value is the more universal is its benefit. Can any nation prevent a new medical remedy or a new educational method born within its own frontier from growing and spreading as far as the soil and the air are capable of carrying it ? Is either England or Germany anxious to have her Shakespeare or her Goethe read by no other people than her own ? Precisely the opposite is the case.

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Each nation on earth is as generous as any other in dealing with its higher kinds of properties and productions. Moslems as well as Christians were alike so eager to make other peoples share their own dearest possession that they had occasionally even to fight the most violent wars against the unwillingness to accept it. What a man owns, when supremely valuable, compels him to share its enjoyment with all others. Our pride must be tested by some universally or exclusively commanding value which we are supporting or creating. Since no value can be so universally commanding as a genuine *moral* value, it is by supporting and creating a true moral kingdom that we can do full justice to our pride. Land, for instance, is one of the most ruthlessly exclusive goods. No man in our age ought to be so mean as to pride himself on monopolising as wide an area as possible because he can do so only at the expense of lowering and narrowing his own moral worth. What pride is there when we love to own land so

that we may depend on others' labour upon it? For it is the labour and not the land which deserves a human and, therefore, moral merit. Land ought to be owned by the State, just as a Government ought not to belong to any private person. For neither of them is a personal, but the one a natural, and the other a mechanical value, whilst we ought not to pride ourselves on that which is less personal at the expense of that which is more personal. Perhaps it is not too quixotic a counsel to say that we should have land not even possessed by any particular State as its private property, just as we should not be content with having Governments each of which claims the self-subsistent, supreme control of interests. The whole earth should be governed by one central authority whose principle is thoroughly moral and whose methods are to give, under the most fair and liberal conditions, the fullest possible development to every human capacity inhabiting it. The enemies, were it inevitable for us to have some, so

that we might enjoy the sensation of exerting our own strength, or so that we might realise a greater solidarity among ourselves than otherwise, must be sought for in the direction either of unhumanised natural forces, or of unmoralised human powers, and nowhere else. To unite men together on the basis of a common blood, language, locality, and history, or some other more purely political and economic interest, is justified or recommended only in so far as it agrees well with, or is impelled by, a genuine moral interest. Otherwise it is a Naturalism at the expense of an Idealism. And it is this latter that gives the most perfect appreciation and realisation to natural forces. We must create a moral empire; and nations and governments have to endeavour after this task as their sole concern. We must fight against ignorance, and the method required is education. We have to conquer selfishness, and the first step to take is to show the concrete example by our own unselfishness.

We are too guilty of self-contradiction not

only in our intellectual but also in our moral activities, and consequently we are in a very real sense frequently abasing ourselves when we are exalted. First of all, let us learn the dignity of our own moral persons, and then let us learn how to be reverent towards all other persons or beings capable of morality. If we have different governments, based upon different nationalities, and have no government based upon the common humanity whose units are moral persons, we have inevitably to suffer from international anarchy. That is so because a moral person does not merely consist of local, racial and traditional elements. If we must have the defence of navy and army for our national persons even more strongly must we have these as a defence for our moral persons. Moral persons, however, are scattered the world over, and are never such fixed realities as national persons. Whenever we are noble and generous in our means as well as ends, we have to be treated as the allies of such moral persons. The moment, however, we

are guilty of a low-minded principle we are the common foes of all moral persons. Indeed, the meaning of nationalism and patriotism is to be sought for nowhere but in this protection and promotion of moral persons. If we are left to ourselves as isolated individuals or as separate small groups like families, we can neither overcome hostile forces nor do good things so successfully as when we are combined together into a larger body. But in order that the larger body may be well consolidated and efficient, the ties by which it is united must be as natural as possible. This explains why and how nationalism and patriotism have come into being and grown so wonderfully as they have. Unless we are backed by a powerful body as a nation or country, it is only too likely to happen that our moral persons will have to be deprived of the freedom requisite for their development and existence. Had the Japanese allowed the Russians to do what the latter wanted to do in 1904 the yellow race in the small islands would have

suffered the same fate as the native savages where the white race colonised. The British people would not listen to Mr. Bertrand Russell's non-resistance "gospel" but to Mr. Lloyd George's warlike measures. Why? Because, amongst other reasons, they cannot imagine that their own moral persons could be safe or happy under the conditions of the eventual German hegemony. Nothing can be gained by the game when it has to be played at the expense of moral persons and of their immediate voice of pride. Pride is no isolated feeling, but an indication of the total calculation of interests. When we are devoid of pride, we can be so because we are devoid of interests which are the ingredients of life. Had it not been for pride how lessened either inter-personal or inter-communal such as international difficulties would be! Then, however, life would lose its first aim, which is nothing but the elevation of quality. The point remains, therefore, what kind of pride we have been having and ought to have. In its applica-

tion to some international warlike relations, for instance, such questions may justly be raised as whether we are fighting for the sake of, or at the expense of, moral persons; whether or no we are actuated by some ignoble principles in our motives as well as measures in waging the war; or how keenly awakened we are to do good things if we are safeguarded in existence and work as the result of a successful war, and so forth. The politicians nowadays talk to the world with an almost customary readiness that they are very anxious to secure the rights and privileges of weak peoples and small states. Each belligerent of the present war, especially the leading Powers on both sides, also cannot make the justification for what they have done and are going to do without trumpeting this apparently over-national moral note. The recognition of the minor nations by the Great Powers, as it is expressed in diplomatic speeches and writings, is genuinely or primarily moral. No Premier or Foreign Minister of an influential

State will proclaim in our day that such-and-such oppressed peoples ought to be freed from such-and-such oppressing nations for the sake of his own State, but for the sake of those peoples themselves and of humanity. The respect for moral persons, whatever their accidental attributes—ethnological or political—might be, is the main thing which he proclaims as of importance. If he was sincere enough, he would naturally have had to begin with the reflection upon the fact that his own State is guilty of a similar oppression or exploitation in some quarters of the world other than where he concentrates his mind because the oppressors there have happened to be the rivals of his own State. Hardly one Great Power is blameless in this connection. This is so not always because a great nation is less humane than a feeble people, but in most cases merely because one has power and the other has not. It belongs still too widely and deeply to the nature of individuals that they are ready to exploit or to take advantage of others whenever

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they are convinced they can. In a collective action, as of a nation towards lesser peoples, this pseudo-heroism is simply far less restricted than when one acts as the only responsible person or as a member of the only responsible family. But we must know that it is a shame for us if we as citizens or as political representatives of a State feel less responsible for national affairs than we do for some more exclusively personal or family affairs. Our pride is then so petty that it is lost in some finite number of mortals. It could at best only reach as far as the frontiers and no farther. But our pride, in order to be a true one, has to draw its whole strength from nothing less than the divine assertion of the cosmic self. Beyond the frontiers, which are fixed by more or less accidental circumstances, there still extends the reality which is capable of moral action and reaction. The absolute patriotism or nationalism was allowed only so long as we thought of foreigners as of morally incapable beings. Now after we have been assured

through various kinds of experiences that compatriots and foreigners are as a rule a classification not by any genuine moral qualities, but by some ethnological and institutional circumstances, we either as citizens or as statesmen must learn how to be ashamed and how to be proud before the tribunal of the moral empire which is possible by the highest and most significant classification of man. The central community which is capable of all authorities and sanctions must be this moral empire, and all the other kinds of groups and associations must always so function as to elevate, consolidate, and expand it for its own sake. Alongside of the fact that an alien person is able to obtain criminal and civil justice with a tolerable approach to equality, as between himself and the subjects of the State, what is more important to take notice of is that we are generally sure of fair treatment by people abroad where we happen to stay. They treat us fairly not always because they are conscious of our legal rights prescribed by the

relevant states but because they are capable of the essentials of morals, which are over-national and are something more immediately personal or human. They feel moral affection, respect, and reverence towards us who do the same towards them. Thus a high-minded conduct and behaviour of a foreigner will hardly fail to win at least the private approval of the people over against a base manner and action of their own compatriot. Such is already the case in most of our civilised societies and countries. We have to recognise these facts and practices which are in being and to bring them into consistency with what we are apt to do in the name of our own country and of our own national interests. What is disgraceful in the case of an individual or of a family cannot be otherwise in the case of a nation, except that the consequence is so much graver because it affects the interests of vast numbers of individuals and families. We have simply to think of some historical instances where a Foreign Secretary or a Ruler decides for or

against a threatening war at the expense of millions of lives and of other economic and cultural resources, or of a more permanent honour and interest of a nation. The lack of imagination and of purity of conscience, and above all, of pride, may only allow us to be morally unscrupulous in our foreign policy as against our private transactions. We must not think that we are justified in sacrificing our personal, moral standard or taste for the benefit of our country. It is moral persons and their well-being that concern a country. We are too easily led to yield our End to our Means. To know in all directions how far our national life in general as well as the life of an average member of a State owe by now themselves to international elements is of course very helpful for widening and deepening our stunted national imagination and conscience. But, more urgently than any other counsel is offered the counsel of realising the moral dignity of one's own person which I term Pride.

Those who look without prejudice at the origin, the development, and the actual as

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well as the eventual peace-settlement of this war will find therein a typical illustration of what a futile philosophy or religion it is which insists upon love simple and pure and neglects entirely the real influence and claims of Pride in human psychology. I have every reason to think that there would have been in the history of mankind an incomparably less amount of evil and so much greater good if we had learned the gospel of Pride in connection with that of Love. Oscar Wilde exhausted his vocabulary in praising humility as another aspect of love in his confessional work—*De Profundis*. He did not know that what was most incumbent upon his own moral or religious person to realise was to get the right insight into the heart of Pride.

Let us proceed a little farther and look at some issues pertaining to the Philosophy of Religion, which will help us in seeing what we mean by our ideal principle of Pride. Teachers of religion still talk so much of sin and repentance and prayer in connection

with faith. We shall see what ought to be done with these practices and ideas from our own point of view. To begin with, we should proclaim that a man could repent of sin only when he was in possession of ideal pride. For it is part of ideal pride that it compels a man to take the entire responsibility for whatever sin he perceives in another or commits in himself. It does so by convincing him of the perfect possibility to fulfil that responsibility which is to be fulfilled at all by an actual achievement and not in mere sentiment or words. If there is a God in connection with this world—for any other kind of God is valueless—He will never forgive anyone for any sin until that person has repented of it by means of practical deeds and consequences which need be so much greater than if he had not been guilty of it as to atone for it. Moreover, to pray or to do anything of a similar nature is often very detrimental for us because we can by such means easily be led to forget the constraining necessity of atoning in a real

way for our own sin. The capital opportunities for the only possible way of being forgiven for our sin are thus missed. Trivial instances of this folly are amongst others given abundantly in the direction of so-called mystical tendencies such as, for instance, practices as well as theories in connection with spiritism or the so-called spiritual healing under various forms and names. Such so-called mystical minds do not realise at all that what makes them rapturous in their spiritistic or miraculous principles is nothing but some consequences presumed by them to be brought forth upon their real existence by believing and practising those principles, which existence, however, can be dealt with only by means of superior forces of the same nature as itself. Thus they do not realise that what enables them to attain their purposes cannot be obtained on any great scale and in any sure way except by an appropriation of the results of science and technics. One truth, which should be emphasised in this connection, is that a faith ought never

to take the place of a scientific or technical activity, but to create such activity so that the state of the existence of reality may be changed in accordance with that faith. Mere faith will never succeed in "removing mountains" except with the help of the necessary scientific and technical activity. And this is the only way in which comes any justification for holding true "If ye have faith, and doubt not, ye shall not only do what is done to the fig-tree, but even if ye shall say unto this mountain, Be thou taken [up and cast into the sea, it shall be done" (Matthew, chap. xxi. 21). So, for a similar reason, would no prayer enable a man to receive what he asks for unless he prays in *action*, and asks by setting up natural necessity. He must for his particular purpose fulfil all the requirements which issue from the side of natural forces and laws which are to be governed only by an intense and intelligent will.

And, again, this is the only way in which a man can find justification for believing

that "all things, whatsoever ye shall ask in prayer, believing, ye shall receive" (Matthew, chap. xxi. 22). "All things are possible to him that believeth." This is true. The only condition which has then to be fulfilled and which, however, can too often be left unfulfilled in our assumed faith concerns the *how*. We must know that to believe in such a way that "all things are possible to him that believeth" is by no means a simple and easy-going business at all, but requires the man to turn all the capacities of his being to account, not only the emotional or sentimental but also, most emphatically, the intellectual and conative. To believe in that fashion is possible only when the man is equipped with an adequate knowledge of means to carry his faith into practice, and is endowed, moreover, with a will-power which is strong enough to enable him to act in accordance with that knowledge. Faith, if it is taken in its proper sense, is so significant a quality that we may almost credit it with everything. That notwith-

standing we have even now such enormous numbers of cases which are called faith but which are really to be ranked with nothing—being anxious for an object in an abstract way in spite of the truth that a genuine faith must always be a faith in a consequence all-consistent with a faith in the process whose outcome the consequence can but be ; that it must be a faith with method, with dynamic logic which is nothing alien to it but is in reality its own nature—shows how imperfectly we have as yet got into the heart of Positivism. Positivism, as it is, we can hardly credit with an ideal form of life-conception or life-principle. But the fact remains that those who can reply without any hesitation to the question “What is your religion ? ” or those who would flatter themselves upon being believers or theists, and would reproach anyone who appears to them as an unbeliever or an atheist, are in most cases even farther from having realised what a truly religious life should be than the positivistic mind which they simply take

to be irreligious. No ignorance, indeed, in our day could be more appalling for a truly religious mind than this kind of ignorance which perhaps still prevails amongst more than half the entire population of civilised countries. True, the positivistic mind may not see things "far off" but only those circumstances and realities which are accessible as well as important to it in a plain manner. These circumstances and realities are none the less of such a nature and influence that no one can ignore them without ignoring how to live at all. To ignore them, in so far as the man does not ignore in practice how to live, means to ignore his own practice, which reveals nothing less than his highest appreciation which, in turn, reveals nothing less than his real faith or conviction *i.e.* his real religion or metaphysics. It is well for us to know that religious or metaphysical principles, in order to be true ones, must necessarily be the finalities to be attained by means of farther pursuance or development of the positivistic principles

to their full realisation, and in compliance with all the necessities inherent in themselves. If every age in history had its own fallacies, one of the most deep-rooted and destructive fallacies of our own age must be the fallacy that is found in an inconsistency between practice and theory in the direction of morality and religion. What we honour in practice we despise in theory, and vice versa. Should it necessarily be so for the benefit of the best possible way of upholding values in life and the world? Is mankind so constituted that it can live best by preserving its fallacies consciously or unconsciously? No, any fallacy which we have ever had was allowed to exist through the stupidity of the masses, or through the inability of some few awakened individuals to rouse their unawakened fellow-members of society more successfully than they had hitherto done. In short, fallacies were allowed to exist on account of the negative hindrances, and, therefore, in spite of all the efforts of the superior portion of mankind as an intelli-

gent whole to communicate itself to the inferior portion of it for the perfect conversion of the latter to the former. Of course it is those superiors to whom society at large and average individuals owe at all times, though not always so appreciatively as they ought, their own real progress or betterment of every kind. Now, the message of positivism, significant as it is, will hardly be possible for us to realise without realising the message of "Pride," which is, as it were, the most immediate endorsing reality of the former. To realise positivism to any definite extent must be in its internal evidence to realise so far "Pride." Thus, it follows that we should never diminish or kill any fit of Pride in ourselves, but help it to realise itself so completely that we should lose sight of its initial appearance. The ideal emancipation of Pride will never fail to make us determine to perfect the entire existence within as well as without ourselves purely on our own personal responsibility. Indeed, so long as men could complacently believe in the ex-

piation of the Saviour for themselves, there was no hope or possibility for humanity of having all those new values created for it which are peculiar to the modern world. No science or technics or industry—nor any such characteristically modern acquisition—could have found the soil for so vigorous a growth as we have been witnessing had it not been that the soil was provided with some new forces, amongst which the positivistic spirit must indisputably be counted as one of the most efficient exponents. How would it be possible for anyone not to realise the truth in positivism, who has an eye for the seriousness of life and reality whose pressure can only be eased by means of a thorough personal responsibility? We must be sure that even “the birds of the heaven” are fed by their own “hand” and that there is no “Heavenly Father” who “feedeth them” apart from their own care and pursuit. Even such inferior kinds of creatures as birds are governed by the universal law of responsibility which suggests the need of realising

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the positivistic spirit everywhere. We who are gifted, or evolved higher than birds are, and are capable of so many achievements, "must sow and reap and gather into barns" so that we may "add even one cubit unto our stature." "Birds sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns" because they cannot, whilst we must do all these things because even birds do their best and help themselves.

I do not recognise any kind of God existent above me and taking charge of making me sinless or sinful by his own will and on his own account. To recognise such a God is for me, or in fact for anyone, of no smaller consequence than to recognise the total bankruptcy of life by surrendering it to a kind of naturalism. For there is here self lost, and where self is lost life is likewise lost. And, further, there is no order or reality to be found at all throughout the entire realm of existence which is superior to the order or reality in each self, which is no less than the "home of ideals" that has to dictate

itself towards the rest of existence which is no more than nature. We must be convinced that the reality existent, if it is taken in its partial aspects, is sometimes even in an awe-inspiring degree approaching to perfection, as is to be seen in the works of geniuses in art or morality at their highest self-realisation, whereas it is, taken as a whole, still so imperfect. They who think or say that the reality existent, though taken in parts is so imperfect, is as a *whole* perfect—so perfect that it must without any further remarks be believed in by us all as God—are themselves as far mistaken as any gross positivists are in representing the true phase of the reality existent. No man is at all justified when he believes in the *whole* because it is the *whole*. What matters whether one believes or not in an object is solely confined to whether the object is qualified to be one's ideal or not. The whole alone can never be perfect unless its parts are all perfect. The empirico-historical knowledge must always be the first authority on which we can judge how

perfect or imperfect existence is. So long as a man has any dissatisfied experience he must be aware that the reality existent even as a whole is imperfect. To believe in the whole because it is the whole is as absurd as to believe in the Creator because he is the Creator. There is but one way in which we can and ought to believe in the whole. To believe in the whole, which it is possible for us to perfect in its minutest details, this is the one way—just as there is but one way in which we can and ought to believe in the Creator. We can and ought to believe in the Creator that is to be found nowhere save in ourselves as well as at no time but *now*. I am no atheist, as no one can really be. I believe in God in both the ways which are at bottom one, and which I claim to be the only legitimate ways for anyone to believe in God. First, I believe in the God that I ought to become. Secondly, I believe in the God by means of whom I can become the God that I ought to become. When a man opens the window so that he may get

fresh air, or when he shuts the door because there is a draught in his room, he confesses, with a power superior to every opposing argument which he may himself consciously cherish or try to develop, that he believes in God precisely in my stated terms. For the whole process tells us that he does not so much believe in the world created or being created in front of him as in the world which he is convinced he himself must create. It tells us that he finds the present state of existence not quite satisfactory, and that he believes in an ideal state of existence as well as in the means by which the latter state can be brought into existence. It tells us that there can be no ideal state of existence apart from the reconstruction of the present reality, which we may term *means*, as well as that there can be no *means* apart from the employment of one's own will and intellect, whose personal experience of want and dissatisfaction with the "given" state of things is what actuates all the procedure. Or, again, it tells us that the man

does not so much believe in the necessity *without*—which means Nature, Fate, or Superpersonal Will—as in the necessity *within*, which is nothing but personal will. Nature is for him nothing less than the present actual reality with its inexhaustible, dormant forces which can, in the direction of betterment, be turned to account, but only by an intense and intelligent will. Nature is like the lilies of the field which must encounter a congenial poetical genius in order to get a brilliant interpretation. On the other hand, man resembles nothing more than the musician who must have the instrument out of which he may even build the “Walls of the City of God,” in order to play at all. Nature is there in front of us as nothing but a possibility as we ourselves are, or to speak more truly, I myself am here over against it as nothing but will, both of which stand or fall always together. Nature, or the objective world in general, will doubtless be in and for itself of a congenial character to ourselves but different only in type and

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growth. For us, however, it is no more than a possibility as we ourselves cannot but be the same for it. Thus it is that we can safely say that there is and can be, speaking strictly, only one will, *i.e.* my own will, or to put it in an objective way, one's own or personal will. It is in my own will and in nothing else that I ever consist. All the other wills except my own have perforce to be translated into the language which is available to the latter, and which spells possibility the moment my own will becomes conscious of itself. My own will and the possibility over against it, the world is made up of no more than these two elements which are at bottom one as the self-perfection of the universe and which are therefore entirely correlated and inter-determined. The very unifying principle, however, is unalterably kept on the part of my own will, and not of the possibility. My own will thus is the very commanding power of the universe. My own will, however, is all this only on condition that it stands for the possibility whose

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self-conscious form it is. We can act at one moment only in one way just as no one can move at once in more than one direction, whilst without acting we are nothing. The universe is the one whole for which I stand and which, therefore, must have only one will, which is nothing but my own will. If there is any one will to which my own will has conscientiously to submit, there is no reason why my own will should remain as such a half-hearted, inconsistent, even superfluous and harmful thing, and should not own that supreme will as my own will. In this connection we might well say that God should be dethroned to my own seat, or that I should be enthroned to his seat. Taking for granted, as we must do, that the rest of the world, except my own will, is in and for itself nothing but the space unreservedly peopled with infinitely numerous wills, it is the part of my own will that it makes itself the will of all those wills. It is natural as well as rational that in the consciousness of my own will all the other wills disappear,

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simply because one can no more will than act at one moment in more than one way. They disappear so that they may take the form of the possibility upon which, and in no other manner, my own will can exert itself at all.

We can never be good, or true, or beautiful, so long as we remain on the level of *duty*, because *duty* presupposes a centre of gravity of values outside oneself, where there can be no centre at all. We are right in our attitude towards the good, or the true, or the beautiful only when we are in the hands of *responsibility* which confirms that centre within oneself where alone it is discoverable. If *duty* could be said to be an imperfect expression of love, as there is certainly a way in which we can think it is, no less correct must we be when we take *responsibility* for an imperfect expression of *pride* in its ideal sense. Just as *love* is a more intimate experience and reality to us as personalities than *duty*, so is *pride* a more direct and closer manifestation of self than *responsibility*. That either *love* or *pride* is more purely emotional than

either *duty* or *responsibility* corresponds to this fact. Whilst either love without duty or pride without responsibility is a very poor thing, an incompetent sentiment, each in its own way, we must know that love apart from pride as duty apart from responsibility is no less helpless. The most urgent business for us all is no doubt to give up love and duty that we may realise them in an altogether more perfect and truer way which presents itself as pride and responsibility. Love and duty, if they are not vices, are, defined by themselves, very unintelligent virtues. Love as well as duty, when they become more completely conscious of themselves, will necessarily prove pride and responsibility to be their very essence. Can anyone love more or be more dutiful than to take the perfection of the imperfect world, amidst which he is placed, as his own personal task ? Can anyone be more altruistic than when he is altruistic under the pressure of his all-absorbing egoism ? Responsibility must take the place of duty. It is well for

us to realise this first of all. And when this is realised, the importance of pride in connection with love will be more than half realised.

There is, in spite of all this, one way for us, which would justify us in holding by the Categorical Imperative of Duty. This must not be taken, however, in the Kantian sense. It has to be taken in accordance with the standpoint which I have already enunciated. There may be always an indefinite number of alternatives for us to act upon, but only *one* of them is worth choosing; any other alternative being less successful in achieving what we really need. On the other hand, there is at any moment such a supreme alternative to be found by anyone, to which he must do justice in order that he may have the most desirable result upon his life. If we should call something by the name of duty, this one most fruitful means must be the only thing for us to do so with plausibility. Duty is categorical for us in so far as it serves our End in the best way. We cannot place too

much emphasis upon the importance of duty when duty is understood in this light, precisely because we cannot place too much emphasis upon the importance of End. Kant and all similar minds the world over would give an absolute value to duty apart from—nay, more, in defiance of even—its service to End. This is most assuredly one of the worst absurdities in which we have ever involved ourselves, and from which we cannot as yet rid ourselves. Indeed, it is still the case that the moral views of most men and women as well as of their teachers revolve round this basic error which corresponds to their no less basic error in the direction of religious ideas. Their God is no more than their duty furnished with more completely personal elements—emotional, conative, and imaginative—which, however, are of the least help to make them see the untruthfulness attaching to their God as well as to their duty. If only they were enabled to see clearly the nature and meaning, either of the God or the duty which they now

uphold, both the one and the other would suffer a natural eclipse in the presence of the most powerful and best-adapted revelation of its own reality which we might designate as a type of metaphysical personalism. All the intellectual elements or qualities that can possibly be found in their conception of God will in no less degree be found in their conception of duty. The mere subjective addition of enthusiasm to the same stock of intellect as an objective power is too poor an increase in our *real* possession or gain. There is something tragicomic about all this, which reminds me of a tale that an intoxicated person, though he feels quite hot, counts all the same before a thermometer. I am sorry to say that I find a good deal of this "something" in a Thomas Carlyle or in a Rudolf Eucken amongst many others. An empty subjectivism or voluntarism can no more prove helpful for us than a shallow objectivism or intellectualism. Mysticism is in almost all cases but another name for vacuity of intelligence, or often even worse,

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a vacuity of conscience, which is good for nothing but bad for all and for everything. We can, however, scarcely deny that there is in our traditional and prevailing conceptions of God an overwhelming influence of this kind of mysticism. To be proud of ignorance is often the wisest way to pass for a man of profound thought or deep conviction. It is almost impossible for most of us to be prophetic without having a slice of charlatanism or without at least having a pitiful amount of intelligence along with a good deal of self-interest, the latter two alone sufficing to make the greatest number of believers and followers. If we wash off all the traditional deceits that cluster about it, we shall find that our faith or belief in connection with religious or moral fundamentals consists of no other mystical elements, if of any, than those which are involved, quite in a testable measure, even in such an ordinary act of ours as the opening of a window or the shutting of a door.

Just as only one straight line can be drawn

between any two given points, so can there be for any one of us at any one moment only one supreme means serving most effectually his purpose, which, therefore, is a Categorical Imperative and which we might call *duty*. Means alone, however, can never be absolute unless the End is absolute. In order to have an absolute means we must be prepared with an absolute purpose, both of which combined together make God in the correct sense. When we think that there is amidst the chaotic universe a cosmic order by adapting ourselves to which we can promote our own cause or interests incomparably better or more wisely than otherwise, we are really believing in our God as means, just as when we talk about the omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence, or anyhow, all-perfection of God, we are really believing in our own purpose. In either of these two cases the secret truth is crudely personal and even as positivistic as when one shuts the door or opens the window. We have no God except the one who is our purpose and means.

Any other kind of God we may have only at the expense of truth and justification. If there is already such a God as is all-perfect, then it is absolutely impossible that we *are* here, who are exposed to constantly occurring as well as permanently indwelling experiences of dissatisfaction, and who are still no less than epitomes of the sole reality. I cannot suffer those who contend for the existence of God as the all-perfect Being residing over and above us, in spite of their being busy with devising means and pursuing purposes, any more than I can suffer those who acquiesce in the doctrine of the “turning of the other cheek when one has been smitten,” whilst they are reviling in every way their foes who have happened to be actual and affect their personal living interest—national is nothing but a kind of personal. “Over and above us” can very well mean not real but ideal. This being understood, God does unquestionably exist as they state. But we must not forget this *ideal* quality of the existence of God. Otherwise, we shall fall into the folly

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of entirely forgetting to take a pride in becoming so good, so true, and so beautiful as to be called divine. We shall solely have to learn how to be contented with ourselves being so mean in motive as well as in power, so stupid and so miserable—in short, so sinful and weak that divine qualities can for ever remain not encroached upon by human beings but glorified by their conscientious humiliation of themselves; as if, indeed, we were trying to make the inferior exceptions of ourselves in order to prove the superior rule of the Deity in spite of the fact that the latter, for its every rise and fall, rests upon the former.

God alone can never exist unless we ourselves exist for him, or to speak more plainly, exist as God exists. When we ourselves cease to be divine or Godlike—this is very important for us to bear in mind—the world or reality itself ceases so far to be divine or Godlike. Precisely in proportion to the weight and magnitude of the ambition, this holy ambition of ourselves becoming

divine, the whole and only reality becomes less or more rational, purposive, or, so to speak, spiritual. Our conception of God, if we happen to have any, must not be such as to be mocked at by a meaning derivable from the lines "all power comes from God, I admit; but every disease comes from him too; does it follow that we are prohibited from calling in a physician?" (Rousseau, *Social Contract*: Edition Tozer, p. 103).

Whether there is God or not is really no shrewd question at all because the position of the universe as contrasted with my own will or anybody's will is rather to be loyal to the latter which is itself not determined but determining. It is we who give or deprive God of existence. The point is, therefore, that we must give the most perfect existence to God by making as much as possible of ourselves. Here lies the *Metaphysics of Pride*.

CHAPTER V

THE PART AND THE WHOLE PERSONAL WORTH AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

IN the case of man the part, as an individual, is decidedly the purpose of the Whole as an institution. But then we must not take the individual as an isolated being, which is a very imperfect possibility. We must take the individual as a centre of the Whole. It is, therefore, better to represent the individual as a moral person. An individual in the true sense is a moral unit of an encircling, larger reality which we might term Society.

When we speak of the Whole, however, we can distinguish at least two senses of the term. One is a natural Whole. The other is an artificial Whole. Carlyle said : " He is in harmony with the Decrees of the Author of this World ; co-operating with them, not

vainly withstanding them : I know to this day, no better definition of Duty than that same. All that is right includes itself in this of co-operating with the real Tendency of the world ; you succeed by this (the World's Tendency will succeed), you are good, and in the right course there." "It has ever been held the highest wisdom for a man not merely to submit to Necessity—Necessity will make him submit,—but to know and believe well that the stern thing which Necessity had ordered was the wisest, the best, the thing wanted there. To cease his frantic pretension of scanning this great God's-World in his small fraction of a brain ; to know that it had verily, though deep beyond his soundings, a Just Law, that the soul of it was Good ;—that his part in it was to conform to the Law of the Whole, and in devout silence follow that ; not questioning it, obeying it as unquestionable. I say, this is yet the only true morality known. . . . This is the soul of Islam ; it is properly the soul of Christianity."

Here Carlyle was confusing the natural Whole and the ideal Whole. What he had in mind was the natural Whole, the Cosmos, the Universe. But he gave it an ideal quality. He was wrong. The Whole as it is or as it is given to us is a natural Whole. It is the Whole on which we have to improve by our own toil. It is like the sun through focusing which we can burn more effectively than if it were left without the aid of our art and effort. Of course we should have nothing to work at had it not been for the surrounding reality which interests us. Our surrounding reality interests us because it is a part of, or an extension of, our own selves. Though it is nothing fundamentally alien to ourselves it still, in most cases, does not well agree with ourselves as manifested in the most immediate consciousness of self. To bring all the portions of reality into harmony with the central self is thus made our constant anxiety and occupation. Without the surrounding reality we should not only have nothing to work upon, but should

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have no existence of our own either. Take away the sun which is the source of warmth and light, or the earth on which I walk and build, what will happen to my own existence ! That we are bound up with every aspect of reality, as every part of the latter is with every other by the Law of Causality, suffices to prove that no existence of our own or of anything short of the absolute Whole is possible apart from the influence of its surroundings. We can never escape from the domain of the Whole of which we are really epitomes or pivots. To get rid of our surroundings is to get rid of ourselves, and would be suicidal if it were possible. So long as we possess a physical nature, and so long as it is connected with the rest of the entire physical world in the causal linkage and susceptibility, we must not dream that we can by any means be something existent by and for ourselves exclusively or isolatedly and not as derivatives or exponents of the Whole. The mental side of our being is precisely co-extensive with the physical side and is sub-

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ject to the influence of every move and stir which take place anywhere in the whole mental world, as soon as our mental persons become aware of them. Before we had learned the Law of the Conservation of Energy we might have been induced to believe that it is possible for the part to be independent of other parts or of the whole. Only imperfect observation on our own side makes the world look as an aggregate of events, things, and beings, or makes any particular phenomenon appear entirely self-subsistent. An individual state or movement, of whatever size it may be, is in reality a state or movement of the whole universe, but only partially observed. A withered leaf falls from the tree. The breeze was nothing save a weapon wielded by the titanic Universe. When I say "Yes" or "No," or act affirmatively or negatively, it is the world itself that says or acts so. I am no more than the mouthpiece of the world in this particular time and place. But because I am no less than that either,

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the cosmic conscience and calculation become necessary for me in every expression and action in order that I may be worthy of my privilege.

Behind the Conservation of Energy there is working the Conservation of Values. If we look into the world so far as it reveals itself as an embodiment of a complete *natural Logic*, and fail to look deeper so as to reach the infinite possibility of an *ideal Logic*, our insight and imagination are as deficient as though we were to contemplate ourselves and merely find Physiology and not Psychology at its back. Kant discovered the source of causality not in the world but in our cognitive mind. It is we ourselves who clothe Nature with Law. For according to him, we look at reality under the forms which are proper to our own intellectual activity. He was mistaken. In so far as the natural order and unity are concerned, it is not through us but by Nature itself that they come into being. Our part is to be discoverers of what Nature is endowed with.

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But the natural Whole is not everything which is capable of existence. There is another Whole which is not only capable, but is most worthy, of existence. It is the ideal Whole. The ideal Whole, however, is not ready for us to discover in existing Nature. We have to be its authors. The natural order and unity are given to us as the materials for the building up of the ideal order and unity. It is this ideal order and unity which we ought to worship and ought to try as faithfully as possible to conform to, as Carlyle indiscriminately suggested. It is, again, this ideal order and unity of which we have to claim to be the dictators as against the natural order and unity our dictatorship of which Kant wrongly claimed.

The ideal Whole, being not given to us as a natural fact but having to be created by us as the result of work, is essentially artificial. Whilst the absolute reality of the natural Whole is indubitable, simply because we cannot believe in the impossibility of the uni-

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versal reign of the Causal Law over all the domains of Nature, the relative reality as well as the absolute possibility of the ideal Whole has firmly to be borne in mind. The grass is cut down as the mower goes along. There is here an application of the Causal Law which without further remarks shows the unity of the natural world. But from the mere fact that an impulse gives rise to a desire which in turn gives rise to an action, each step co-operating with certain intellectual elements, we can hardly conclude to the complete teleological universe as the all-perfect system of Values. The simple experience that we feel to be unsatisfactory breaks down the whole structure of any static type of rationalism which holds that the world as it is is already spiritual enough. That which depends upon us for its rise and fall, and that which it is incumbent upon us to give every possible aid and growth to, is the ideal whole with the order and unity peculiarly its own. The natural whole, with its own order and unity, takes care of itself.

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For it is no real entity but the shadow of the ideal whole, imperfect as it is. Wherever there is something existent whose reality cannot but be spiritual, though as yet more or less incomplete in being so, there appears the natural whole in some form or other. The possibility of reality, which is in itself spiritual, of making itself felt to the senses and to the higher intellectual capacities, so long as these remain purely cognitive, is functionally so confined as to bring forth the world of sensations, perceptions, and conceptions alone, throughout which the material substance, with its mechanical law, counts for everything. Our concern remains, simply and purely, to convert as much as possible the natural whole into the ideal whole. To put it more plainly, we have to endeavour to help to raise the present stage of reality—which is so far spiritual—to a still higher level. This process of the perfecting of reality, so far as we at present know, has attained two most representative agents. The one is the individual,

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and the other is society as a collective whole.

In the case of inert things, such as a stone or a piece of wood, a whole of any assumed magnitude is unconditionally more than any part belonging to the whole. The question, however, is not so simple when the part assumed is the individual person, and the whole assumed is the community or the universe to which that person belongs. The person can in some respects be more than the whole. As for the natural whole the person can claim a superiority to it by guiding it and giving a higher form of expression to its potentiality. A simple example of our using a scythe to cut grass and using devices for checking the ravages of storms, floods, insects, and even birds in order that we may grow crops, serves as an illustration. When we cultivate the soil, as a matter of human necessity, though the process seems largely to be anti-natural, we are really pro-natural. We ourselves are, if regarded from the ultimate point of view, nothing but parts

of nature which are, however, superior in quality to the rest which we know. Thus it happens that what the natural whole accomplishes through us is generally a higher type of self-realisation than what it does otherwise. Just as the control of the initial, natural inclinations by the reflective, ideal will is admitted to be a moral necessity, so ought the government of external nature by human purpose to be considered as a moral merit, not only from the exclusively human point of view, but from the universal, metaphysical point of view as well. This is so because we as well as all other particular parts of the whole have to live for the sake of the whole so as to be perfected. There can be no excuse for any partial existence insisting upon its own interest except when that interest agrees well with the interest of the whole. The interest of the part must properly be the interest of the whole working where the part finds itself. It is right and commendable that every part should try to perfect the whole more fully than any other

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parts do. To excel others in public service is not only harmless but a most important aspect of moral life. The only thing that determines the superiority and the inferiority of different existences must be the differences in absolute values between them. A true master and a true servant will both be entirely free from any kind of personal abuse, from selfish pride as well as from servile humility. They pursue, each in accord with his own power, the ideal necessity of the common self as the absolute whole. The universe itself is one self, the only self. A pious life consists in realising this truth in thought and in action. In proportion as we identify in thought and action our own empirical selves with our own absolute self we are true and real and great. The source of a genuine happiness can never be found elsewhere. In this light, speaking generally, we can safely assume that we as human beings are entitled to be the masters of nature.

With the ideal whole, however, the case differs essentially. For the sake of expedi-

ency, we may presume law as the social order, to be the typical specimen of the ideal whole. Just as innumerable different kinds of natural laws, physical, chemical, physiological, etc., find their unity in the Great Causal Law, so do all the various and particular branches of artificial laws find their unity in the one growing tree of the ideal whole. The causal law does not grow because it has no reality of its own. The natural world, however, unceasingly flows and changes because the reality of which it is the reflection always grows. We find the natural whole ever moving forward, simply because its own substance is the ideal whole whose principle is growth. Nature changes, whilst life grows. The ideal whole, as it is represented in the form of the artificial law, thus requires for its qualification, in the first place, loyalty to the principle of growth.

Law is there because we create it. We create law because the law which is imposed upon us as the natural law does not satisfy us. We are capable of making our own

laws which promote the growth of life more successfully than the natural laws do. This being the original and properly the permanent meaning of every artificial law, we constantly need to examine how far our present laws are achieving their purpose and try, if possible, to make them more fruitful than they are at the time. Each person has numbers of laws set up by himself so that he may live more economically, in the broadest application of the term, than otherwise. He may have hygienic rules as to eating, sleeping, and exercise. He observes them not because those rules are in themselves sacred but because they are necessary for him in order to live well. What is sacred remains as his own life and its growth. The law of parsimony in its positive as well as negative sense, and as applied to human life in general, accounts for the nature and significance of all artificial laws.

The genesis and development of conceptions out of minor ideas and perceptions are nowadays explained by some economic

principles in connection with the preservation of life. So long as our intellectual capability is merely perceptual, we cannot command the interests related to our own life beyond the range of our sight, hearing, and so forth. By inventing the ideas of numbers, for instance, we can not only save the energy involved in counting by means of our ten fingers, but also find our way to more than ten units with no less accuracy than to ten. Artificial laws, different though they may be in other respects, partake of this utilitarian quality with all natural laws as viewed from their cognitive, subjective side. Time, space, causality, and substantiality—all these natural conceptions help us to our success and prosperity as well as all ideal conceptions such as legal and moral canons do. Both types of conceptions have in common their fundamental meaning of economising life for its own sake. But the natural conceptions are grounded in objective necessity. They stand for the past and the external side of reality. They tell us how things have been

and what things outside us are. The same reality has, however, some other aspects. It has the future. It has an internal side. All the ideal conceptions are grounded in subjective necessity, which subsists in the future and in the internal side of reality. The will and the feeling are what reality in its future and internal aspects is. Its expression is in the form of ideals. Thus the ideal conceptions are in the first place the outcome of will and feeling, whilst the natural conceptions are, in the first place, the outcome of intellect. Intellect discovers, whilst feeling and will create. Intellect translates reality into our own language. The result is sensations, perceptions, ideas, and conceptions. Intellect is not much more than a mirror, and only endowed with an active power which is feeling and will. Intellect alone never creates nor ever invents. It merely informs us of what is there. The code of natural laws is all that intellect can bring forth. But, so long as we are capable of feeling and willing,

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the mere code of natural laws does not suffice for us. It naturally anticipates the code of ideal laws which directly concern our will and feeling and only subsidiarily concern our intellect; just inversely with the code of natural laws. The kernel of all ideal conceptions is thus ascertained to be the will and feeling which are most *personal*.

The purpose of all artificial laws is, therefore, lost in proportion as they are less personal. We saw that the purpose of all artificial laws was the growth of life. Now, to be personal and to be in favour of growth are no different principles. The nature of the will and feeling requires of one to grow ever more and more so as finally one may even become the complete master of the whole universe. However far we may succeed in our pursuit on these lines, it is the common destiny of all mortals to participate in this world-encompassing, personal aspiration after perfection. The simple fact that no one ever feels entirely satisfied tells

enough of this truth. The cause is the feeling and will, and the effect is reconstruction of the outside world, or the bringing about of some new facts into it. The method of personal growth is therefore creative. When the river swells by the rain from the mountains, we may call it a mechanical change and nothing more, because the effect is the continuity of the cause, both of which are perceptible and mathematically calculable. When the same river swells by our lifting up the lock, it can hardly be called a merely mechanical change, because the very cause of the effect is neither perceptible nor mathematically calculable. Still the cause is far from being nothing. Feeling and will can never be called nothing. They are something more than perceptible or mathematically calculable. They are the objects of the most immediate experience. They are experience as such. No intermediate instrument is required for proving them. Even when we have no eyes to see, no ears to hear, we still feel and will so long as we

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are something conscious or even vital, or, farther down, real at all.

The ideal laws are the laws of creativeness. Personal existence is possible only as a creative activity. We cannot feel without subsequently willing, and further, we cannot will without consequently bringing forth some new order of things into the existing world, which amounts to creation. The more personal we are the more creative. The ideal laws ought, in the first place, to be criticised as to how far they are helpful to creativeness as the only mode of existence of personal beings whose essence is will and feeling, and ought accordingly to be improved upon.

A law taken by itself is always a formal quality, whether in the case of a natural law or in the case of an ideal law. In the case of a natural law, it has its own reality only as the form of what exists, and has, therefore, no reality of its own. Substance is everything. Only the substance can never subsist without assuming a certain form.

An existence has its mode. A natural law is simply the mode of an existence as it is. An artificial law is also a mode of an existence and nothing more. But here the existence is not taken as it is. An existence in the case of an artificial law means existence as an ideal possibility. If we think of a natural law as something real even apart from a natural substance, it is a plain error. Just so, if we think of an artificial law as something valuable even apart from an ideal substance, it is a great mistake. An artificial law, at its best, is the form by filling in which we can achieve the best possible development for our ideal substance. Creative activity is our ideal substance. The end must always, and decidedly, remain the creative activity of our own persons, and any artificial law in order to be a true one must be held up as the means for us to achieve that end most successfully. Economy is what an artificial law ought to do and also can possibly do for us. But economy is never an end by itself. We economise so

that we may live and live in a prosperous fashion. To live and live well is the end. The How comes always after the What. Life and its creative activity are what we are most concerned with as personal beings. How to succeed in this paramount interest is first of all answered by instituting artificial laws. Because we are interested in improving upon the natural existence by our own ideal possibility, we are obliged to improve upon the natural law by our own ideal law. By a natural existence we can mean an existence which is not personal. To convert all natural existence into personal existence is what we aim at, viewed from one side, in our creative activity. If we think of an artificial law as something valuable, even apart from our ideal substance, we shall be guilty of converting personal existence into a natural existence. The result will be the introduction into the universe of more of mechanical blind forces, and the reduction of personal forces in it. A gross materialism or naturalism or fatalism

is what the law for the sake of law, as practice or as theory, in effect aims at. Look at a politician, or a citizen, or even a thinker, whose insight and imagination can hardly get beyond patriotism and nationalism! How dwindled is a personal quality in them and how over-swollen are they with something unintelligent, shallow, and deadening! Nationalism and patriotism in an exclusive form have not necessarily a connection with the standpoint of law for the sake of law. But there is often a close connection between them, and our own age is perhaps the most conspicuous instance. To this point we shall, however, return later on.

An artificial law, taken by itself, is not only formal or external or non-real, but is capable only of generalisation and not of particularisation. A law, even when artificial, by its nature tends to allow of no exception. It rejoices when it is expanded in its sphere of application. It protests when it is restricted to some very limited cases and occasions. But life is not merely worthy of

generalisation, but also requires particularisation. If we view life as a whole, and try to discover its structure, we shall find that quantity and quality are so proportioned as to make a concrete example of the logical extension and intension. The more extensive the lower the quality, and conversely, the higher the quality the more intensive. Feeding, clothing, housing—all such necessities are vital to the interest of all persons. They are most extensive in demand. A man of extraordinary gifts on one hand, and a man of ordinary talent on the other, must alike be given opportunities for obtaining those elementary goods, without which their personal existence and development are hardly possible. Most of the public as well as the private laws we possess attempt to answer this purpose of doing full justice to some kinds of common interests or other of persons and of groups of persons. Security for life and limb, for property, and for certain fundamental kinds of honour, is needful to every member of the community.

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It is good for us to institute laws where we can possibly find common interests among persons who can act and be acted upon by each other. What one person would like to have or not to have for himself is what his neighbour would like to have or not to have for himself also. I as well as my neighbour do not care to be killed or to have my things stolen. It is therefore better for me as well as for my neighbour to invent an embodiment of those interests which we have in common—an embodiment in the form of an artificial law prepared with sanctioning power so far as possible. In the case of absolutely two persons, *i.e.* of the community which consists of two members alone, this process of legislation and the operation of the enacted laws cannot be so successful as when there is a third person. The third person is naturally more disinterested than the other two who have happened to collide with each other on account of some common interests which, however, have only partially been realised by both parties. To speak the

truth, what is valuable to myself or to my neighbour must equally be valuable to my neighbour or to myself respectively. For I as well as my neighbour stand and work for the same whole universe except in two different positions with their corresponding two different perspectives. But the difference between the positions and their perspectives ought properly to be the division of labour with its co-operative spirit. At the outset they exist only as participating in the one natural whole governed by the single causal law. Their progression as well as end cannot but be in participating in the one artificial whole governed by the single ideal law. The law, with its executive power, is meant to be the third person who is purely moral and therefore capable of playing the part of corrector. The moral person common to all natural persons in one community has been abstracted and given a definite being. Thus has the law come into existence. The conscience operative within all the individual members of one community has been

furnished with a kind of objective standardisation, the outcome of which is the law. The law stands for conscience, for moral persons. The ideal whole, actually achieved by certain numbers of persons as a group, forms and is represented by the law. But, because the generation and the growth of law are bound to keep pace with the need of all the persons of the community, law can hardly ever be a sufficient manifestation of the best conscience of few choice individuals of the age and society where that law obtains. At least the majority are far from being indifferent to the ideal circumstances under which they may enjoy life free from the fear of homicide, theft, adultery, forgery, slander, etc. To give birth to the law which expressly informs us that we should be punished if we were guilty of them, and to maintain it effectively, can very easily become a factor of public opinion. But public opinion is a necessary step preceding legislation if we wish to make such legislation a happy and fruitful one at all. Public opinion, however,

is no other than some thought, sentiment, and interest focusing themselves in each of the members of a community, who are the majority, with a sufficient intensity and clarity for making them unanimous in calling for a new order of things. We cannot impose a law upon the people who are not able to understand it, or at least to believe in it. A surgeon may justly perform an operation on his patient without the patient's knowledge of the surgeon's skill, but not without the patient's faith in it. But the majority, in their faith as well as in their knowledge, lag behind the minority who are always those who initiate a new order of things. The majority never possesses the ability to share in full measure what the minority possesses as the common worth or property of all persons and of humanity. Public opinion is possible only where the majority is actually awake to the need of a new order which will benefit all of them. For instance, the international anarchy under which we have been living will still continue

so long as the majority of nations and of their individual members remain blind to the absurdity of the present system of national States, each of which assumes the moral as well as legal paramount authority. The majority in most countries is neither so wicked nor so base as to stick to an exclusive nationalism in order to be able to enjoy the slaughter of their fellow-men. What they lack is knowledge and culture, to speak nothing of insight and imagination, which are rather beyond education and which, therefore, do not concern us in our practical politics. They do not know what foreigners are, nor do they know what their own actual as well as ideal life consists of. If we are justified, as we really are, in understanding by friends co-partners and co-workers in our higher and essential ideals, sentiments, and schemes as well as in our more ordinary interests, we should find that we are under obligation to many friends who may happen to be of the remotest nationality, whether geographically, or chronologically, or ethno-

logically, or, finally, politically. We are always too impervious both to the kingdom of facts as well as of values, of which we are subjects and sovereigns. On the one hand, we are very eager to make business with foreign countries by supplying their wants and importing what they can possibly provide. But, on the other hand, we are always ready to expand our own interest as a national one even at the extreme expense of some foreign countries, when we possess the power notwithstanding the lack of moral justification. If we have a whit of moral pride and of human sympathy, there cannot be the slightest doubt that we ought either to abstain from the peaceful exchange of interests in ordinary days, or to abstain from the war-like steps starting from too opportunistic motives. If some countries alien to us have produced scientific, artistic, technical men of genius and talent to whom we have been greatly indebted in our own national as well as individual development, this simple fact in itself ought to suffice to

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make us forgo the abuse and abasement with which we might be tempted to treat their native countries had we faith in power and opportunity alone and not in higher moral principles. There could be no greater hypocrisy, insincerity, or, above all, unmanliness than to deal with foreign nations with friendly and conscientious mien, so long as we have neither power nor opportunity to exploit them, but are ready to change from a saint to a tiger the moment we are convinced that we can successfully do so. But such suicidal and self-contradictory ideas and practices as are involved in our exclusive patriotism and nationalism are not easy for the majority even of the present generation to become aware of, although international elements are nowadays so abundantly woven into our life. Before we can establish the laws with adequate executive power in the interest of nations and of all moral persons to live free from the disadvantages attached to the state of international anarchy, we have to educate public opinion

the world over. The majority of us must be prepared to see and feel and will the realisation of a new order better than the existing one. And when a new order might happily be brought into existence, another and further dissatisfaction and perfection would hardly fail to breed in the bosoms of some of the minority. Thus law is never capable of initiating new values, but is entitled to secure for these values general support and enjoyment. The ground-work as well as the key-stone of a law should not be too deep or too lofty for the majority to esteem and appreciate, because the end of the law is chiefly for the majority to have their own, otherwise merely subjective and individual, and, therefore uncertain, conscience in the form of a universal and necessary obligation. The bulk of legal acts is almost unnecessary for those who have a scrupulous conscience and a well-informed common-sense. Law is rather the minimum morality of the community at its present stage of development. In order to be ap-

plicable to the community without exception law is obliged to reckon first of all with the average. To keep the public order by doing justice to the highest moral and intellectual capacity of the most ordinary person is the most we can reasonably expect from legislation. To promote the social well-being by doing justice to the highest moral and intellectual capacity of the most excellent person is often neglected or even hampered. In the interest of taking care of the commoners who are most in number, law is even apt to prove to be a destructive force to the superiors who are least in number but excel in quality and ought to be given as much freedom and help as possible for their development on behalf no less of the commoners than of themselves. The true philosophy of law should require that law must be so given as to regulate some general interests of all persons of the community, because it cannot go farther, and that it must in its spirit comply with those interests which are beyond the range of general

regulation on account of their excellence. The principle of law must not fundamentally differ from the principle of art. In both cases it must be free, creative, and personal. The conclusion is naturally that we must extend the realm of law as the common interests grow, but always reverence that peculiar kingdom where interests are as yet both unique and rare. To the State, therefore, which we may take to be the supreme embodiment of law, remains the task of governing and controlling all the secondary and tertiary applications of the most fundamental moral and philosophical principles. The very fundamental moral and philosophical principles, however, always transcend the State, and have to direct and create whatever the State consists of. Anarchism is wrong because it is devoid of the knowledge and appreciation of the less spiritual and more mechanical parts of life, which can be most successfully dealt with by means of the law and the State. On the other hand, socialism is a failure when it thinks it to be

possible or desirable that the social reform will be complete if all human interests and works are directly managed by the State, or the guild, *i.e.* by the union or association of some form or other. They forget that the limbs without the brain are as monstrous an impossibility as the brain without the limbs. They forget, also, that the limbs and the brain require different sorts of treatment, that the limbs require a gymnastic training, whilst the brain requires cultural enlightenment and education. The well-being of the whole person, or, to speak more properly, of the person at all, is possible by applying both treatments to both parts systematically and on a single unifying principle. Personalism in the highest sense of the term must always be kept sacred so that the State, or any kind of organised institution, can be spiritual. And conversely, the State, to speak elliptically, must positively be prompted and encouraged towards its ever-growing domination on condition that it knows what its function means. It is for the sake of liberty

that we welcome order. The law, the State—all social orders are themselves under the guidance and command of the superior power which ought to be the best conscience of the time, which in turn stands for the absolute judgment of an all-seeing Providence. The law, the State, or any other social order which is made not only for the sake of average persons in the community or of average qualities in all the persons of the community, but is also conducted by them alone, is wrong and detrimental not only to those who are superior to the average but to themselves. If the average persons are alone the law-givers, the administrators, and the politicians, it is inevitable that the State will be subject to the tyrannical rule of mediocre interests. Democracy ought certainly to take the place of any merely external and accidental aristocracy, because in so far as wealth and rank and like things are concerned, it is not birth but character and ability that deserve their enjoyment both for one's own sake and the sake of the com-

munity. Wealth and rank have their own influence upon the happiness and welfare of the community. The reason why one person in the community is allowed to be more than another in wealth or rank must not be anything else than that he is more than the other in his required character and ability for turning to account the peculiar powers belonging to that wealth or rank for the sake of the community. Equality between needs and supply, and between merit and reward, is what we have to secure in our social reform. And as far as a certain amount of physical needs is contemplated, it is common to all persons, as is exemplified in the needs for food, clothing, and housing, tolerable for healthy living and effectual work. A certain degree of intellectual needs is also common to all the persons of the community, as is to be seen in the needs of elementary education. We are all in need of spiritual as well as material sustenance and help, and these being given, we are capable of producing what our community

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wants to have. The community must give to all its members at least the minimum necessities for their existence and development, cultural as well as economical, so that they may be enabled to create capacities of their own from the satisfied needs and then to create goods both to their own as well as to the community's benefit by exerting their capacities. What follows from these considerations is that the control and management by the State is by far preferable to the individual or private care in so far as the needs and capacities are evenly distributed over all the members of the community. Just as we can economise our energy very much by means of a concept when we have to deal with a number of similar percepts, so should the law, with its representative institutions, save by its own sweeping method the labour which otherwise must be wasted even for less effect. Instead of each person of the community undertaking for himself the protection of his own life and property, we have the police and the court that not only

save our available energy but enable us to enjoy a larger realisation of our purposes. The same economic principle applies more or less to all our interests except those which are real as yet only amongst a very small minority. Thus it happens that a rudimentary kind of education should be supervised by the State rather than by private persons, as is shown by most of the progressive countries in our day. But even in the case of the rudimentary stage of education, it is only the mechanical part of the work that the State should take the control over. The spirit of education, even when a teacher of a moral subject has to deal with the pupils in an elementary school, must directly come from the very best soul of the teacher and appeal to the very best soul of the pupils. The highest principles of morals constitute the essence of that which should be communicated from the teacher to the pupils. The teacher must be well awakened to the need of himself becoming and of the pupils being made as good and able personalities as

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possible. Before the children are made anything in particular, say, worthy citizens, they must be made worthy persons. This principal part of education, however, can never be supervised by anything but the best conscience of the teacher himself. Unless the teacher himself is determined and striving to be a conscientious able man, how could he inspire the souls of the children to attain that goal? To inspire the developing souls of children is, nevertheless, the very kernel of education and of teaching whether in or out of school. Personal inspiration and influence are by far more important than the inspiration and influence exercised by any external authority. The dignity of a moral person is what is most needful for the teacher to realise so that he may awaken it in his pupils. Without a well-awakened and cultivated sense of the dignity of a moral person, the whole work of civilisation is nothing. The honour and interest of a nation, or the freedom and prosperity of a country—none of these can ever take pre-

cedence of moral dignity. Jesus was right when he said "For what shall a man be profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and forfeit his life? or what shall a man give in exchange for his life?" (Matthew, chap. xvi. 26). The very aim and end of education is the development of this supreme worth even in children. But this supreme worth, both in its origin and destination, or in its nature and significance, is altogether personal, or to put it in another way, is immediately cosmic. The conscience or God is the only adequate expression for it; any other worth or reality falls inevitably short thereof. In this sense, the part as a moral person, or the person as a moral unit, is at the same time the whole to which any other worth or reality, inclusive of laws and of human associations of all descriptions, must assume an inferior or subordinate rank. Social conscience of any kind, whether in connection with the family, or the corporation, or the State, or even associations of a more specific character such as, *e.g.* scientific, artistic, or

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industrial association, can only exist as a part of one's cosmic, *i.e.* comprehensively individual, conscience. Religion, even though much depends upon what sort it is, is thus the paramount directing power of all other powers. The Churches which work at the bidding of the State rather than at the genuine conscience of individuals, or the teachers of morality who are inspired from some smaller sources rather than from their own cosmic personal interest, are really guilty of a false realisation of their proper mission and function. So long as the State originates in personal demands and serves them, it is for the benefit of the State to be humble as well as pious before the best religious consciousness amongst its members. Where there are Churches or moral teachers who are mainly under the influence of the State, there is in truth hardly a Church or moral teacher at all. And it is of course the State and its members who suffer from the abnormal conditions under which the healthy and happy existence and develop-

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ment of both the State and its members are impossible. We must always be sure of the presence in ourselves of the supreme authority which is genuinely moral and which transcends any but cosmic-personal self-consciousness and self-assertion. And this is true no matter in what kind of particular business and pursuit we may actually be engaged. When we act as citizens or as statesmen we must be well aware that our citizenship or our statesmanship is never a final or primary task for us to fulfil, but a partial realisation of the whole, for the sake of which and also in accordance with which any partial realisation must be directed and governed. Religious life must be living and working wherever we live and work at all. How can we gain the slightest notion of such a true religious life if we are blind to the awe which pertains to our moral persons, since each such moral person stands directly for the ideal cosmic whole. But mundane things even of a spiritual nature are never quite free from mechanical cares. Those

mechanical cares, however, which are necessary for the spiritual existence and growth of the community can be best undertaken by the State. For instance, the payment of teachers and the equipment of schools can be better done by the State than by private persons. On the whole, those interests and activities which are rather general, or mechanical and routine, should fall to the State. To put it in a word, the State should undertake the quantitative side. The qualitative side, on the other hand, remains for ever the high privilege of individuals.

All this holds true of our economic life as well as elsewhere. Both capital and labour, in so far as they are subject to quantitative management, are better controlled by the State. It is good for operatives to form their own union so that they may avail themselves of all the advantages pertaining to the organisation which they must forgo if they have to act singly. By contributing to the common fund they are enabled to hold out for a fair price for their labour. Insistence

upon proper conditions of labour, such as minimum wages, maximum hours, hygienic care in the factory, etc., will hardly be possible unless men themselves are federated and can act as one man. By dealing with the employers not as an impecunious and often ignorant individual labourer but as a member of the association which is interested in any one of its members no less than in its own existence as a whole, a workman can effectively cope with the employers who have money, knowledge, and power, which may be used to exploit a helpless and solitary labourer. But besides the Strike, which ought not to be the primary and necessary object of the organisation of labour, there are many advantages which make the association of labour sufficiently worth having. The position and value of labour as such can be more justly and perfectly estimated by means of an organised unity of labour than if labour were left in a state of atomic chaos. If the union has as its officials men who are recognised experts in the art of adjusting

labour to the demands of the market and of securing for it a fair remuneration, the individual workman can overcome the disadvantages of his limited knowledge of the actual industrial world. In short, it is for the sake of the collective and, consequently, individual development of labour that it forms its union. The same holds true of capital. It is good for capitalists to form their own associations. Here also the primary and necessary object is not to make a lock-out effective. The main purpose of organising capital is to make the most of capital so that the value and significance of capital as such may be more justly appreciated than if it were left in the state of individual competition alone. Just as labour is immediately a property of the community, so likewise capital is never private but rather public. Neither of them ought to be wasted for the mere sake of selfish interest. Capital when organised can save a great deal of the cost peculiar to isolated and competitive private undertakings, as is to be

seen, on a small scale, in the typical instance of the distribution of milk. Instead of three milkmen, each with his own cart, serving three customers who live next door to one another, and driving a second and third time a long way to perform a similar business, no two milkmen will have to be employed for one district but for two different districts, if the capital is organised. The result is the saving of labour and cost, which will make possible the cheapening of milk, the better payment of producers and distributors, to say nothing of quantitative or even qualitative improvement in the output of milk. The more the capital is organised the less waste for merely competitive advertisements and for overlapping commercial travellers, besides many other employments and costs peculiar to an unorganised system of capital. Chemical industry, for instance, which requires too large a capital for most private undertakings, is naturally bound to be a business suitable for a syndicate, or a more or less direct State-undertaking. America

and Germany have shown some examples with their factories capable of availing themselves of efficient laboratory works.

But a true organisation of industry as well as of any other human work cannot be accomplished without sufficient regard being paid to giving to each component the best possible facilities for developing itself. An organisation, when properly carried out, or meant to be so, is a natural consequence of its lesser units struggling for their own respective self-assertion. One of the grandest cases of this issue has been seen in the formation of nations and states as they now are, and is to be seen in that organisation of nations which is still to come. Nations as they now are, are very much better organised, both upon their internal as well as their external side, than they used to be in earlier days. Families, clans, tribes, provinces have formed, or grown into, one nation according to their natural facilities for making an artificial tie as a body politic—facilities such as common blood, language,

and history. Even the present war, in spite of all its disrupting effects, will hardly fail to bring the nations to a greater unity than was theirs before. The Allied Countries, on the one hand, and the Opposed Countries, on the other, have had, and still have, both respectively, a most pregnant common history in connection with the war. Even when the economic as well as the military solidarity had been brought into being on each side of the belligerents as a result of the existing conflict, the world should be congratulated for its having procured such few opposing parties—roughly speaking, only two. Instead of having England, France, Russia, Germany, Austria, and Turkey each against the other in tariff and defence, we shall have the first three as one unity and the latter three as another. To reach two larger unities from six smaller unities is itself something approaching the one comprehensive and paramount unity of Europe, to speak of Europe alone. This optimistic view of the issues of the present

world conflict was clear enough not to be questioned even at the very beginning of its history. The development of the war, moreover, has, simply though not always manifestly, been calling for ever greater forces to carry the world nearer the goal of a larger unity. The hatred between England and Germany, to take the most aggravated point, will be but a bad dream of a past night if we, all men and women of the nations, *think* and try a trifle more earnestly to enlighten ourselves with regard to the problems which press upon us but which take advantage of our ignorance. Indeed, we have to know the world a little better as well as to learn how to respect ourselves. We must be clearer and surer than we now are of the centre where all our problems, with their solutions, are made possible. The centre of human business lies always in the person taken morally. The purpose of man's activity is solely to produce the better world likewise morally, which is nothing but another aspect of confirming

that centre to be found only in the moral person.

Organisation in the form of a whole means a co-operative system of parts. What is required for an organisation is thus the specialisation of parts. Some countries and peoples are different from others in their natural as well as human gifts and capabilities. One country may be endowed with excellent mineral resources. Why should not the inhabitants there apply themselves more particularly to the development of these and their employment in manufacture? Another country may be richer in arable land than in other natural endowments. Why should not the inhabitants there apply themselves more particularly to agricultural pursuits? So with peoples. One race may be rather gifted artistically, but another practically, both in detail demanding a more complex classification. Why should they not pursue their own peculiar faculties so that they may do full justice to themselves and serve their neighbours best by

way of the happy exchange of products and works ? Those who believe in self-subsistency alone, whether on a national scale or on a more or less smaller scale, are guilty of the folly of believing in uniformity and not in unity. Unity presupposes variety. The more varieties the greater unity. The earlier the stage of evolution the more complete homogeneity and its concomitant of uniformity. There is nothing wonderful that an absolute self-subsistent policy moves along the lines of a militarism which suggests something primitive and uniform. To raise barriers against the imports of foreign goods so that we may develop domestic industry is to slacken too easily a genuine heroism which alone will after all enable us to develop home industry and to compete successfully with foreign industries. We must love our enemies because they give us opportunities to develop ourselves so as to cope with them. The stronger the enemies the greater our need of exerting creative faculties. The result is the growth of both our opponents

as well as of ourselves to the extent to which they are naturally allowed to attain. The realisation of nature to some extent or other is what we can do. And the most synthetic and constructive realisation of nature is what we always ought to do. Economic protectionism will do us more harm than good unless a very circumspect consideration is made before it is adopted. To defeat our enemies by some external and artificial means rather than by genuine worth prevents us from obtaining the best success, though there is something very tempting about the former process. Fair competition is what saves us. In order to have fair competition we must, however, willingly accept the conditions of equal opportunities. To lose in quality results in losing in quantity. If we lose in heroic resolve and effort in our dealings with rivals and enemies, it is we ourselves who have to pay most heavily for our temporary comfort and ease, deceptive as these qualities may be. There is a great deal of this philosophy about the comparative popu-

larity and success of England in this war in contrast with Germany. Germany, in her foreign policy, has been less liberal than England before as well as since the war. Free trade has no doubt helped England to gain friends. A nation that is as strenuous as the modern Germans have been will naturally grow very wonderfully in so far as internal development alone is concerned. But she will some day find the odds against her in comparison with a nation that has been planting prestige abroad on a liberal basis and discover that such a nation may successfully carry out a war of national competition under the more or less justifiable plea of the common cause and interest of nations. We must develop ourselves fully. This is all that we are morally obliged to do. But this impels us to respect and help the same interest of self-development of our neighbours. We, as a nation as well as an individual, must live in such a way that we shall be useful and even necessary to our neighbours. But the way to be most

THE PART AND THE WHOLE

useful and necessary to our neighbours is for us to make the most of our own capabilities. The intrinsic and extrinsic developments are essentially one and the same principle. Here is the key to the question of the relation of the *whole* and the *part*. We must organise our Society so as to enable us to enhance specialisation ever more completely, whether nationally or individually. It is by the completion of specialisation alone that the world can be organised. Co-operation is most perfect when it is based on an intelligent specialisation. So long as we have nations as ideally (for *really* this is impossible) self-subsistent units we can never escape recurring wars. We plan the organisation of nations not because we must never again have war at all, but because individuals in the world can realise their own individualities far better under the organised system of nations than under the present unorganised one, whilst the realisation of our own individualities is the best thing we can ever attain to. War is disreputable not because

it is war but when it is the result of our moral and intellectual weakness. But what shall be the fundamental working principle for making the organisation of nations a happy and successful one? An absolute recognition of a genuine moral worth in each component person of the world-community is the thing required. We may differ one from another so far as any but moral worth is concerned. We can never differ except in degree when our very moral worth is concerned. This is what binds us all together for the sake of the common end. The question, however, is very complicated when it is considered as it should be in a practical light. Are not most individuals in every country too weak in their imagination and intellect to grasp the possibility and necessity of raising the one moral empire paramount to all the other wholes, an empire which answers directly to the part as a moral person? Until a short time ago where nations and peoples lived largely by their own means, exclusive nationalism might

have been a true patriotism. History has changed and progressed. Nations have been having since at least the last fifty years, to an extent beyond our ordinary conception, their common history. The most potent factor for making a nation is no doubt a common history. Linguistic or generic affinity is not so essential an element as a common history in producing a new nation, especially now that the concept of *mankind* has anyhow so far grown. Even a pet dog is sometimes dearer to us than some of our compatriots are. For at least a couple of generations nations have been, ever more increasingly, having their common history both materially as well as spiritually, thanks, in the first place, to the development of means for communication, travel, and transport. Each of us is somehow or other a consumer and, normally, a producer as well. We have something to buy and, normally, have something to sell also, whether materially or spiritually. As consumers or buyers, and likewise as producers or sellers, indi-

viduals of nations are nowadays not dependent upon home products alone nor upon home markets alone. Far less is this so in the case of big business and important professional men and women. Take, for instance, some medical and surgical remedies and apparatus. Do we not, whether as patient or as physician, often avail ourselves of remedies of foreign origin? Not infrequently it is foreigners who cure us not only physically but mentally as well. In Philosophy, in Science, in Art and Literature, and in Religion, are we, especially those who are leading as experts in each country, exclusively indebted to domestic supplies for our study, practice, and pursuit? Most fresh suggestions, enlightenments, and encouragements as well as instructions come rather from beyond one's own national boundaries. Honest reflection on the part of any expert, whether in theory or in practice, will at once show him how profoundly he is indebted to the international, cultural, and economic community. I call it ignoble when we are

not grateful to those for whose merits our own success is accountable. I call it cowardly when we prove to be more devoted to those who live near us though they are enemies or strangers in any intelligent moral meaning, than to those who live far away from us but only in sight, hearing, and touch. Proper pride, once again, is what we need. Ignorance must be removed. Able and intellectual books and reading ought to be imposed upon individuals in each country almost compulsorily, since this is the most effective method to educate the public. To carry all this through, there must, in the first place, arise, throughout nations and peoples, determined groups and centres of inspired agents, female as well as male, old as well as young. One who suffers for the human cause is promised a reward, first in his conviction, then in the world's consequence.

CHAPTER VI

THE NECESSITY OF A NEW RELIGION : CONCLUSION

ALL the existing problems, some of which we have touched upon in the preceding chapters, point directly, as well as indirectly, to the need for a new life and society which amounts to the formation of a new religion. We need not be shocked by the phrase "a new religion," for whenever a man has a genuine religion it must essentially be a new one. The social organisation of faith, though important, still remains a subordinate aspect of religion. The primary quality of a religion must always be something purely personal. Churches with all their formalities are far from constituting the most important part of a religion, for this part must belong as

immediately as possible to our own existence. Nothing can be more personal than religion. Where there is a personal being or life at all there is naturally a religion or the possibility of one. The guiding principle of a life, both in action and theory, is what a religion in essence should be. An existence, of whatever kind it may be, is nothing but a religious life. But religious life is subject to infinitely different degrees of perfection. Often we mean by a religious life the perfect, and, therefore, ideal sort of religious life over against an actual and, therefore, imperfect sort of religious life. We are right in doing so, though this scarcely shows that religious life is possible only for sectarians.

One of the most appalling fallacies, even at the present day, is the notion that religious life is possible only for Christians, or for Buddhists, or for Mohammedans, and so forth, and not possible for those individuals who belong to none of these confessions. This is obviously absurd; it would imply that the Founder of any historical religion

had no religious life. For in the beginning of any established religion the Founder was the sole believer. We are capable of various kinds of achievement, and naturally subject to various kinds of external influence; we must nevertheless endeavour to possess as perfect a personal unity and identity as possible. This is what makes us religious beings. As a politician that which a man is most keenly interested in is successful politics. The physician is zealous to be a better healer. The sphere of attention differs widely according to the difference of occupation. This is more or less the case with an individual also. Each of us is almost as complicated as a State. So far as I am awake to hygienic needs I am a medical man. I am a financier. I am a soldier, a diplomatist, a business man, an educationist, and an artist and thinker. But just as there is a Prime Minister who presides over and directs all the Departmental Ministers so must we have a guiding principle for all that we can possibly be and do. A religious life

is as necessary for a mathematician as for a poet. To be the best, and to do our best, in any particular aspect of life, must always be backed by the purpose of being the best as a whole life. We must not live merely to eat or to drink or to sing or to calculate or to build or to marry or to perform or enjoy any particular part of a whole personal life, but must do all those things for the sake of the whole personal life. If Philosophy could be defined as a division of human labour which tries above all to attain an intellectual unity of life as a whole, religion should be defined as the practical as well as the theoretical unity of life. A new theology is necessarily a philosophy. And the substance of a new theology cannot be anything other than politics, industry, education, and art.

The synthesis of existing life-contents furnishes the only possibility whereby a religion can subsist. What are the existing life-contents of our own age and of the present moment? Horizontally, there are national and international trends and in-

clinations. Vertically, there are aristocratic and democratic demands and impulses. There stands æstheticism on the one hand and industrialism on the other. Reactionaries and iconoclasts are marching through hundreds of social, moral, and theological highways and byways to win the day each for themselves. An intense individualistic temperament is still confronted with an ever wider stretching intellectualistic and collectivistic movement. Quantitative eagerness is set against qualitative aspiration. Mechanism and spontaneity are both alike needed. Creativeness, responsibility, personal dignity and emancipation, practical test and improvement, intelligence, power, beauty—ideas like these compel us to pay infinite heed to themselves. The snake is no doubt preparing to reappear in a fresh garb.

Here and there, the world over, grass is dried up and even enkindled. What is lacking is only an adequate breeze. What to-day seems to most of us a fantastic ab-

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surdity will to-morrow prove to be a most congenial truth. But there is no human energy which can do a greater amount of work than is measured by its initial charge just as there is no explosive whose efficiency is not limited by its accumulated force. Let us, therefore, gather more that we may spontaneously burst into activity. But what shall we gather? In the first place, we have to gather all the *facts* which are parts of, and make up the whole of, the present human life and its circumstances. Notwithstanding the infinite diversity of ideas, sentiments, tastes, interests, capabilities, and practices, we shall find, after study and reflection, that there is living, moving, and growing only one big mind on the whole earth, or perhaps in the whole universe. We as individuals and groups are no more than the cells of an organism. Since, however, we are not merely natural but mainly self-conscious and self-determining agents of the whole, we realise the purpose and meaning of the whole within ourselves, and thus in

PRINCIPLES OF THE MORAL EMPIRE

quality we become the masters of the whole though in quantity we remain merely parts of the whole. Religion or the religious life is nowhere possible but where we try to realise as perfectly as possible this purpose and meaning of the whole within our own finite selves.

Religion is bound to be always new because time, the substance of which is existence, is perpetually moving from the past and making headway into the future. To interpret the temporal as well as the spatial dimensions of existence, with all their contents, from a person's own position (who exists then and there) is the method of any genuine religious life. This is so because religion concerns the *meaning* of existence, and endeavours to be *the* meaning of all meanings possible to us. The world both in time and space is indefinable. The consciousness of self is thus given to us as the only clue by which we can reach the meaning of the world. By appealing to our own self-consciousness the world is altogether

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definable. We are ready even to fight against the whole of mankind if only our own ultimate self-consciousness bids us do so. That strange and wonderful and unique authority of one's own real conscience comes from no other source than the infinite universe with its vital interests at stake. To deal with finite interests with this infinite interest of conscience is religious life in the ideal sense of the term. Without religion, therefore, the world becomes meaningless.

Our present practices and ideas of all sorts, political, ecclesiastical, and social, need continual re-examination in order that we may know how well and truly they are related to the central soul. Some call war sublime. But a movement, when it is lacking in an intimate relation to the soul, is nothing but a kind of physical movement. With physical movement, however, we as human beings can never excel the natural movements of stars—the whole globe, with warriors now conflicting on its surface, is moving just in the same direction and with the same pace

as in the time of peace. An action or movement, in order to be ethically or intellectually or æsthetically and in the end religiously valuable, needs to be the expression of the soul. It ought to be nothing short of the direct manifestation of the best soul. Intelligence and fine feeling, alongside of a strong will-power, are what we must create before any effective measures, whether with regard to social or moral or theological reforms, can be undertaken.

We have for a long time been taught that the polytheistic age has passed away for mankind, at least for its better portion as represented by the civilised peoples. I doubt how far we have been right in this opinion. Are not nations gods on their own account? Are not classes another set of gods also on their own account? If we really had reached the monotheistic stage of development in our religious conceptions, there would have been a little better understanding between nations as well as between classes. There would then have prevailed a little more methodical

treatment of Values amongst nations, classes, and individuals. We should then have been a little more capable of classifying and systematising Values according to their relative or proportionate importance. God, properly understood, is no other than the Supreme Value. There can be no Supreme Value except as the specialising and organising principle of all possible Values. Personal worth is everything in so far as the meaning of existence is concerned. We are always ready to fall back upon our own personal worth as it is felt within ourselves, and to fight the hardest defensive war against any number of odds the moment Fate compels us to choose between the surrender and the maintenance of that personal worth. But, on the other hand, we constantly endeavour to develop our own personal worth in all its dimensions. Human activities such as political, industrial, technical, scientific, and philosophical are nothing but the phenomena of this personal development and perfection. Very likely the endeavour of all

personal beings towards their own perfection indicates the endeavour of the Cosmic Whole after its own perfection. The building up of a rich, strong, and lofty character is perhaps no less the aim of the universe and of all its movements than it is the aim of human mortals and of all their actions. The development and perfection of a personal being make out thus in a double sense the truth of all truths. It is religion that directly tries to identify itself with this sole and all-comprehensive truth. Let us try first to perfect our own personal beings. We shall then naturally find that the perfection of our own beings is not possible unless we perfect the world. The secret of all trends and conations within ourselves, which are at the same time both centrifugal and centripetal—such as those discussed in the previous chapters—will accordingly fall into the realm where we know how to think and act. The recognition of both Facts and Values will be complete only when we have realised their meaning and brought all of them to a

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religious conclusion. A religion living on facts, and facts soaked in religion, are what we are in need of for the sake of religion as well as of facts. Because facts are present, existing, living, working, and growing, religion alone cannot be past, reminiscent, dead, idle, and decaying. Who will find out the natural ramifications interpenetrating the existing human race and society that we may effectively specialise and organise all the forces in and about them? Every man and woman, in their own position, are responsible for this task so long as they are interested in or related to either facts or a religion at all. Capability follows responsibility.

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